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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
In Search of a Lost Effect: Generality of Discrepancy Effects in Memory Paradigms
by
Ji hae Lee
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Mark McDaniel, Chair
The current project investigated the generality of discrepancy effect in retrospective memory
(RM) reported by Whittlesea and colleagues (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a) and the
generality of discrepancy effect in prospective memory (PM) reported by McDaniel and
colleagues (e.g., McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004). Experiments 1a and 2 tested
the claim that discrepancy, elicited by mismatching the expected and the actual processing
fluency, can give rise to familiarity under an RM context and increase familiarity judgments of
discrepant items, independent of previous encounters with those items. Experiment 1b tested the
claim that, within a PM context, such discrepancy can signal that discrepant items are significant
and this significance can initiate the search for the source of the significance, thereby enhancing
PM performance for discrepant PM cues. The current project attempted to elicit discrepancy by
implementing a processing fluency paradigm with masked priming and a modified perceptual
mask for Experiments 1a and 1b or high and low frequency words for Experiment 2. The
discrepancy was manipulated by mismatching/matching the processing fluency of some items to
the processing fluency of other items (e.g., fluent items embedded within disfluent items =
discrepant items). In Experiment 1a, hit rates were higher for more fluently processed items (i.e.,
viii

items with no perceptual mask) than less fluently processed items (items with a difficult
perceptual mask), independent of discrepancy. In Experiment 2, hit rates were higher for low
frequency words than high frequency words, independent of discrepancy. Furthermore, both in
Experiments 1a and 2, false alarm rates did not differ as a function of discrepancy, fluency, or
word frequency. In Experiment 1b, PM performance did not differ between discrepant and
nondiscrepant PM cues. These results suggest that the discrepancy effects in RM and PM might
not be as general as previously claimed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature
Review
How do we recognize faces of people we have previously encountered? How do we
recognize material covered in the lecture while taking a multiple-choice exam? For decades,
psychologists have investigated the basis of recognition judgment, the kind of information
guiding the judgment of whether or not a particular item was previously encountered. One
prevalent line of recognition research proposes that two distinctive processes influence
recognition memory judgment, recollection and familiarity (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Jacoby,
1983, 1991; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). Recollection refers to remembering
something with detailed information about its previous encounter. Familiarity, on the other
hand, refers to judging something as previously encountered based on the familiar feeling
without the definite details of its previous encounter (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby &
Whitehouse, 1989; Whittlesea, 1993; for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002).
How do people remember to deliver a message to a colleague upon meeting him/her?
How do people remember to turn off an oven while cooking? Over the years, researchers
have investigated the basis of successful prospective memory (PM), the kind of information
guiding one to remember to perform an intended action in the future. While a prompt to enter
into a retrieval mode is provided for people when performing retrospective memory (RM)
tasks (e.g., “Did you study this face?”), no such prompt is provided for PM tasks. For
example, to perform a PM task of delivering a message to a colleague, one has to recognize
the particular colleague as the PM cue while being busily engaged in a conversation with a
group of colleagues and retrieve the PM intention associated with that cue without being
prompted at the appropriate moment. One prevalent line of PM research proposes that
1

multiple mechanisms underlie the recognition of the PM cue and the retrieval of the PM
intention (Multiprocess framework, McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007). According to the
multiprocess framework, people may engage in strategic monitoring processes in some
circumstances (e.g., when multiple PM cues are used, Cohen, Jaudas, & Gollwitzer, 2008)
and rely on relatively spontaneous retrieval processes in other circumstances (e.g., single PM
cue with a long delay between the encoding of PM intention and encountering of first PM cue,
Scullin, McDaniel, Shelton, & Lee, 2010).
Although the explicit prompt for retrieval is present only in RM tasks, both RM and
PM tasks might be supported by similar underlying processes. Some researchers have
suggested that fluency (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) or discrepancy (e.g., Whittlesea &
Williams, 2001a) might give rise to familiarity in RM tasks and consequently influence
recognition judgments. Other researchers have suggested that fluency (McDaniel, 1995) or
discrepancy (e.g., McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein, & Breneiser, 2004) might give rise to
significance in PM tasks and consequently influence the recognition of the PM cue and the
retrieval of the PM intention. The current project investigated the role of discrepancy, as well
as the role of fluency, in RM and PM tasks. Below, the theoretical roles of fluency and
discrepancy for supporting familiarity processes in recognition memory tasks will be
discussed first and then followed by their possible roles in PM tasks.
1.1 Familiarity Driven by Fluency
Researchers differ on what they think gives rise to familiarity (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas,
1981; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). Jacoby and colleagues (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981;
Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) suggested that perceptual processing fluency of an item can
give rise to familiarity and increase the likelihood of something to be judged as previously
2

encountered, independent of its previous encounter (see Experiment 3 in Whittlesea, 1993,
for evidence supporting that conceptual processing fluency of an item also can give rise to
familiarity). They proposed that items with higher fluency in a recognition test are more
likely to be judged as familiar than items with lower fluency (e.g., Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby,
Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985;
Kelley & Jacoby, 1998; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). In support of this proposal,
Jacoby and colleagues have shown that perceptually more fluently processed items in a
recognition test were more likely judged as having been previously encountered than
perceptually less fluently processed items, whether those items were previously encountered
(correct “old” response to a recognition task termed as hit) or not encountered (incorrect
“old” response termed as false alarm).
For example, Whittlesea, Jacoby, and Girard (1990) manipulated the perceptual
fluency of words during a recognition memory test by altering the density of dots that
composed the perceptual mask covering both studied and nonstudied words. They observed
that previously studied words were more likely judged to have been studied than those that
were not previously studied. Moreover, they found that recognition probes with the lower
density perceptual mask were identified and processed more fluently, based on the faster
reaction times (RTs) of pronunciation of the probes. More importantly, these probes were
more likely judged as having been previously studied than probes with the higher density
perceptual mask that were processed less fluently, whether the recognition probes were
previously studied or not. Another important aspect of this effect is that only when
participants were unaware of the source of varying fluency (i.e., density of perceptual mask),
more fluently processed items received higher rates of hit and false alarm (in Experiments 1
3

and 2). On the other hand, when participants were told of the source of varying fluency,
higher fluency did not increase the familiarity judgments for recognition probes, whether they
were studied or not (in Experiment 3). Whittlesea et al. interpreted their findings to indicate
that the processing fluency of an item during the recognition test can be interpreted and
attributed as familiarity, and this incorrect attribution is possible when participants do not
take the correct source of fluency into consideration. Using processing fluency as a basis for
familiarity is an efficient heuristic because previously encountered, familiar items are
processed more fluently than previously not encountered, unfamiliar items. When participants
can identify the correct source of increased fluency, they attribute the fluency to its correct
source and consequently do not misattribute the fluency to familiarity.
Another example showing that processing fluency influences familiarity judgments is
with the use of a “context” word prior to the presentation of recognition probes. During a
recognition memory test of words, Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) presented a word that was
either identical or unrelated to recognition probes for a brief 50 or long 200 msec in
Experiment 1 (or 16 versus 600 msec in Experiment 2). Their reasoning was that the
presentation of an identical “context” word can facilitate the processing of a subsequent
recognition probe compared to the presentation of a no “context” word. Presentation of an
unrelated “context” word, however, can disrupt the processing of a subsequent recognition
probe compared to the presentation of a no “context” word. Furthermore, with the short
presentation duration (e.g., 50 or 16 msec) of “context” words, participants would be unable
to attribute the relatively higher fluency to its correct source, thereby falsely attributing the
heightened fluency to familiarity. In support of this reasoning, with the 50 msec of a
“context” word presentation, both studied and nonstudied recognition probes preceded by
4

identical “context” words were more likely judged as previously studied compared to the
baseline items with no “context” words. Recognition probes preceded by unrelated “context”
words were less likely judged as previously studied compared to the baseline items. With the
long presentation duration (e.g., 200 or 600 msec), participants could correctly identify the
source of the increased fluency of recognition probes. This led participants to discount the
fluency of recognition probes preceded by the identical “context” words, lowering the
likelihood of judging those probes as previously studied, either the probes were studied or
nonstudied, compared to the probes preceded by unrelated or no “context” words.
1.2 Familiarity Driven by Discrepancy
Despite the fact that the fluency-driven familiarity view (fluency attribution account)
has been able to explain findings in the recognition memory literature (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas,
1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Whittlesea et al., 1990; Whittlesea, 1993), Whittlesea and
colleagues (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b) have proposed that it is not
fluency per se that gives rise to familiarity. Instead, according to Whittlesea and colleagues,
discrepancy that is induced by the violation of expected and experienced processing fluency
gives rise to familiarity. In support of this proposal, Whittlesea and Williams (1998, 2000,
2001a, 2001b) have shown in various experiments that less fluently processed items can be
more likely judged as previously studied than more fluently processed items. Based on these
findings, Whittlesea and Williams (e.g., 2001a) developed the discrepancy attribution account.
According to this account, people chronically evaluate the quality of their mental processing
by comparing the expected processing quality and the actual processing quality. The expected
processing quality is constructed from one’s knowledge or previous experience, whereas the
actual processing quality is developed from the online experience. If the expected quality
5

matches the experienced quality, no discrepancy is signaled. However, if they mismatch,
discrepancy is signaled. Once discrepancy is signaled, the cognitive system attempts to
resolve that discrepancy by attributing it to a plausible, but not necessarily correct, source. In
the context of a recognition memory test, discrepancy of recognition probes can be attributed
as familiarity of those probes and consequently increase the endorsement of “old” responses
for them. Whittlesea and colleagues found substantial support for their framework in the form
of higher false alarm and hit rates for the discrepant items compared to the nondiscrepant
items (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b).
In Experiments 1 and 2 (1998), Whittlesea and Williams had their participants study
a list of words, pronounceable nonwords (e.g., BELINT, LAFER), and pseudo-homophones
that sounded the same as regular English words but had unusual spelling (e.g., PHRAWG,
KANSER). Prior to making a recognition judgment for each test probe, participants were
asked to pronounce the test probe (and additionally make a lexical decision on it in some, but
not all, experiments), which emphasized the difference in processing fluency across words,
pronounceable nonwords, and pseudo-homophones. If fluency were to guide familiarity
judgments, false alarm rates should have been the highest for the words with the fastest
pronunciation (and lexical decision) RTs, followed by the pseudo-homophones which were
pronounced faster than pronounceable nonwords.
However, Whittlesea and Williams (1998) found higher false alarm rates, not for the
words, but for the pseudo-homophones that had slower RTs than words. According to
Whittlesea and Williams, participants might initially develop an expectation of less fluent
processing of a pseudo-homophone because of its unusual spelling. However, when
participants experience a fluent reminding of a real word that has the same sound as the
6

pseudo-homophone, they might find that experience surprising and this surprise could elicit
discrepancy. This discrepancy could increase the false alarm rate of pseudo-homophones
relative to that of words or pronounceable nonwords.
Although the hit rate of pseudo-homophones was comparable to that of words,
Whittlesea and Williams (1998) argued that the comparison of hit rates between different
types of recognition probes in such an experiment could be misleading. Whittlesea and
Williams suggested that memorability of previously studied probes (e.g., ease with elaborate
encoding) could vary between words and nonwords and subsequently lead to different hit
rates of words and nonwords even in the absence of discrepancy. On the other hand,
memorability for nonstudied probes should not vary as much at the baseline level, allowing
an easier observation of the discrepancy effect. They further argued that fluent processing of
words and less fluent processing of pronounceable nonwords simply matched the expected
processing fluency for each stimulus type, therefore did not elicit discrepancy, and
consequently did not increase familiarity and false alarm rates for those stimulus types.
In another series of experiments, Whittlesea and colleague (Whittlesea & Williams,
1998, 2000, 2001a) had their participants study a list of words (e.g., DAISY, RAINBOW),
orthographically regular nonwords (e.g., HENSION, PINGLE), and orthographically
irregular nonwords (e.g., STOFWUS, LICTPUB). Again, if fluency was to guide familiarity
judgments, (hit and) false alarm rates should have been the highest for the words with the
fastest pronunciation and lexical decision RTs, followed by the orthographically regular
nonwords which were processed faster than orthographically irregular nonwords. However,
Whittlesea and Williams found higher false alarm rates for the orthographically regular
nonwords compared to both words and orthographically irregular nonwords. Their
7

explanation for this finding was that surprisingly more fluent processing of orthographically
regular nonwords violated one’s expectation for processing of nonwords and subsequently
elicited discrepancy. This discrepancy was incorrectly attributed as familiarity originating
from a previous study episode because participants failed to take orthographical regularity
into consideration when attributing fluency to its possible source.
In addition to reporting experiments that showed the discrepancy-enhanced
familiarity judgments described above, Whittlesea and Williams reinterpreted the data that
were previously explained by fluency as being explained by discrepancy. Whittlesea and
Williams (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001b; see also, Whittlesea, 1993) used a set of words that
served as the final word in various types of sentences. After studying a list of words,
participants were asked to read a sentence without the final word and make a recognition
judgment on the final word upon its subsequent presentation. Some of the sentences were
written such that the final word (with several other words) can be semantically consistent
with the rest of the sentence (e.g., “Broom” as the final word for “She couldn't find a place to
put the ...”). Other sentences were written such that the final word was (somewhat but not
definitely) predictive from the rest of the sentence (e.g., “Beach” for “They swam and played
at the …”). According to the fluency attribution account, final words presented in a predictive
sentence should be judged more familiar than those in a consistent sentence given that the
former are read faster than the latter (e.g., Experiment 2 in Whittlesea, 1993). Consistent with
this prediction, Whittlesea (Experiment 3, 1993) found higher hit and false alarm rates for
final words presented in the predictive sentence compared to those in the consistent sentence.
However, in later work, Whittlesea and Williams (2001b) provided a revised
interpretation of the higher hit and false alarm rates for final words presented in the predictive
8

sentences reported in the previous work (Whittlesea, 1993). They argued that such data were
driven by discrepancy, instead of fluency, that was induced by interaction of sentence type
and the design feature of how the final words were presented. They argued that the 2-second
presentation rate of a sentence stem prior to the presentation of a final word could have
allowed participants to finish reading the sentence stem and occasionally experience a pause
prior to the presentation of a final word. This occasional pause does not induce discrepancy
for the final words in the consistent sentence stems because participants would not expect any
particular final word to follow. However, this occasional pause in the predictive sentence
stems could induce discrepancy because predictive-sentence stems lead participants to build
general expectations for possible final words and to experience uncertainty with the pause.
When the final word is presented after the pause, participants might find the final word to fit
the predictive sentence surprisingly well and attribute that surprise, discrepancy, to
familiarity.
To test this revised interpretation, Whittlesea and Williams (2001b) experimentally
manipulated the presence of a pause between different types of sentence stems and final
words. Indeed, Whittlesea and Williams found higher false alarm rates for final words in the
predictive sentence stem compared to those in the consistent sentence stem when the pause
(250 msec) preceded the final word. They also found higher hit rates for the discrepant final
words (that were presented after a pause in the predictive sentence stem) than for the
nondiscrepant final words. They concluded that when the presence and absence of
discrepancy is manipulated within the same stimulus type (e.g., words serving as either
discrepant or nondiscrepant items), one can observe the effect of discrepancy on hit rates as
well as on false alarm rates. According to Whittlesea and Williams, this comparison (of hit
9

rates) was not informative in experiments where the presence and absence of discrepancy
were manipulated across different stimulus types (e.g., orthographically regular nonwords
and words serving as discrepant and nondiscrepant items, respectively). Rates of false alarms
and hits did not differ as a function of sentence stem type when no pause was inserted prior to
the presentation of final words, corroborating the discrepancy-based interpretation over the
fluency-based interpretation.
Whittlesea and colleagues have argued that discrepancy is a robust effect by showing
its influence across a range of conditions including recognition memory (e.g., Whittlesea &
Leboe, 2003; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; but see Cleary et al., 2007),
false memory (Whittlesea, 2002; Whittlesea, Masson, & Hughes, 2005; but see Karpicke,
McCabe, & Roediger, 2008), the revelation effect (e.g., Bernstein, Whittlesea & Loftus,
2002) and various types of materials (e.g., words and nonwords, Whittlesea & Williams,
1998; words in different sentences, Whittlesea & Williams, 2001b; and musical tones,
Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a). Furthermore, although discrepancy is attributed as familiarity
of items in the context of a recognition memory test, they suggested that it can also be
attributed as something else in different contexts (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a). In
support of this argument, studies have found that discrepancy can influence various
judgments, such as preference (Willems, Van der Linden, & Bastin, 2007) or subjective truth
(Hansen, Dechêne, & Wänke, 2008).
For example, Willems et al. (2007) had their participants study a mix of clear and
blurred pictures of faces and make either recognition judgments with remember/know
responses or preference judgments on those faces. They argued that participants would build
an expectation for lower processing fluency for blurred pictures compared to clear pictures.
10

However, when both types of pictures were previously studied and the study episode
increased fluency for those pictures (compared to those that were not previously studied),
only the enhanced fluency of the blurred pictures, not that of clear pictures, would violate that
expectation and induce discrepancy. In line with this idea, Willems et al. found that
participants made more “know” judgments, which are driven by familiarity, for previously
studied blurred pictures than previously studied clear pictures. Furthermore, “remember”
judgments, which are driven by recollection, were the same between the two types of pictures,
providing additional support for the discrepancy attribution account. Moreover, when the
participants were asked to make preference judgments on the half of studied pictures that
were not used for the recognition memory task, they judged the blurred pictures more
preferable than the clear pictures. Based on these findings, Willems et al. argued that the
same discrepancy that was attributed as familiarity for the blurred pictures in the context of
recognition memory task could be attributed as preference in the context of a preference task.
Hansen et al. (2008) also provided additional evidence supporting the claim that
discrepancy can be attributed as something other than familiarity. Their participants rated the
subjective truth of a list of sentences that were written either with a greater color contrast
between font and background, thus, perceptually fluent, or with a lower color contrast, thus,
disfluent. Fluent sentences were rated truer when they were preceded by disfluent sentences,
thus, discrepant, than when they were preceded by fluent sentences, thus, nondiscrepant.
Findings from Hansen et al. as well as Willems et al. (2007) support the claim that
discrepancy can be attributed to a wide range of plausible sources.
1.3 Discrepancy Effects on Prospective Memory
The contextual sensitivity of discrepancy attribution reviewed above encouraged
11

McDaniel and his colleagues to adopt discrepancy as a possible mechanism underlying PM
(the discrepancy-plus-search account, McDaniel et al., 2004). The typical laboratory eventbased PM task requires participants to engage in an ongoing activity, such as a lexical
decision task (LDT) where a string of letters is judged either as a word or nonword. In
addition to the ongoing task demand, participants are instructed to make a PM response (e.g.,
pressing the “q” key) whenever they see a particular PM cue appear (e.g., any word starting
with the letter “o”) during the ongoing task. To make the correct PM response, participants
have to recognize a stimulus as the PM cue that is associated with the PM intention, while
engaged in the ongoing task. Once a stimulus is recognized as the PM cue, participants have
to retrieve the PM intention associated with the PM cue. Given that the recognition and
retrieval in a PM task have to be initiated without being explicitly prompted, McDaniel et al.
suggested that, within the PM context, discrepancy from a stimulus, elicited by a mismatch
between the expected processing quality and the actual processing quality, might be
interpreted as indicating significance (rather than familiarity) of that stimulus. The
significance of the stimulus then is assumed to serve as an exogenous cue, promoting the
search for the source of that significance. This search likely leads to the recognition of the
item as a PM cue and the retrieval of the PM intention.
Studies have found support for the discrepancy-plus-search account (Breneiser &
McDaniel, 2006; Guynn & McDaniel, 2007; Lee & McDaniel, 2013; McDaniel et al., 2004;
Thomas & McBride, 2015). For instance, in a paradigm where the ongoing task was to solve
anagrams and the PM task was to press a specific key for anagrams of particular words (e.g.,
anagrams for “lawyer” or “orange”), Lee and McDaniel manipulated discrepancy by
mismatching the expected and the actual difficulty level of the anagram solution for PM cues.
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In this experiment, the use of subliminal priming of the anagram solution and the varying
degrees of letter dislocation in anagrams allowed the experimenters to vary the difficulty of
anagrams, hence, processing fluency of them, without participants being able to specify the
source of fluency. The expectation (of subsequent anagrams’ difficulty) was built by having
participants solve a list of anagrams with a particular solution difficulty. For example, those
who solved a list of anagrams with easy solutions presumably developed the expectation that
the subsequent anagrams would be easy to solve. This expectation was met by PM cue
anagrams with easy solutions in the nondiscrepant condition and was violated by PM cue
anagrams with difficult solutions in the discrepant condition. In the other conditions,
participants developed the expectation for anagrams with difficult solutions in both the
nondiscrepant and the discrepant conditions, respectively.
Lee and McDaniel (2013) found their participants were more likely to make the PM
response of pressing the “q” key while solving anagrams for the discrepant PM cue anagrams
than for the nondiscrepant PM cue anagrams. More specifically, both easy PM cues
embedded in the difficult list and difficult PM cues embedded in the easy list showed the PM
improvement. Furthermore, lack of relative slowing of RTs for nontarget anagrams in the PM
block compared to that in the control block corroborated that the higher PM performance for
the discrepant PM cues were more likely to be driven by discrepancy processes. If monitoring
processes enhanced PM performance for the discrepant PM cues, the RTs of nontarget trials
in the PM block would have been slower compared to the RTs of nontarget trials in the
control block (McDaniel et al., 2004; Smith, 2003). Lee and McDaniel’s findings suggest that
discrepancy can indeed facilitate PM performance. If fluency of PM cue, not discrepancy,
enhanced PM performance according to the familiarity view proposed by McDaniel (1995), a
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main effect of PM cue difficulty would have been observed. However, it is noteworthy that
the highest PM performance in their experiment was found not with the easy PM cues but
with the difficult PM cues embedded in the list of easy anagrams. Corroborating the findings
of Lee and McDaniel, Thomas and McBride (2015) also found higher PM performance for
discrepant PM cues that were processed less fluently due to semantic incongruence with the
rest of ongoing task stimuli (i.e., PM cues being exemplars of less dominant category during
a category decision task) compared to nondiscrepant PM cues that were fluently processed
(PM cues being exemplars of more dominant category).
1.4 Counter-arguments for Discrepancy Effects in Retrospective Memory
Although studies have provided support for the claims stating that discrepancy can
give rise to familiarity (e.g., Goldinger & Hansen, 2005; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000,
2001a, 2001b) and can be attributed to something other than familiarity across different
contexts (Lee & McDaniel, 2013; Hansen et al., 2008; Thomas & McBride, 2015; Willems et
al., 2007), discrepancy might not be as potent a phenomenon as Whittlesea and colleagues
have claimed for a number of reasons. First, most of the items with which Whittlesea claimed
to have found the discrepancy effect could be considered as relatively more fluent items,
instead of relatively disfluent items. For example, orthographically regular nonwords are
pronounced less fluently than words, but are pronounced more fluently than orthographically
irregular nonwords (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). If so, the fluency attribution account
can provide an explanation for increased familiarity judgments for those items. Also, several
studies have provided alternative explanations for the discrepancy effect on false memory
(Karpicke et al., 2008) and recognition memory (Clearly et al., 2007).
Consider, for example, the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) effect. Whittlesea
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and colleagues (Whittlesea, 2002; Whittlesea et al., 2005) argued that discrepancy might
underlie false memory. False memory refers to increased false recognition or recall of critical
items (that are not presented) that are strongly associated with a list of items that was studied
compared to critical items of a nonstudied list (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995). More
specifically, Whittlesea (2002) claimed that although the studying of associates of critical
items enhances semantic processing of critical items, the lack of study of critical items would
lead to perceptual processing of critical items being surprisingly not fluent, hence, inducing
discrepancy. Subsequently, this surprise-induced discrepancy can be attributed as familiarity
of critical items and increase false memory for them. However, Karpicke et al. (2008) tested
and disputed this claim by directly asking their participants if they experienced surprise with
any recognition probes during a memory test. They found typical false memory for critical
items of the studied list but did not find those items to be judged more surprising (in
Experiment 1) or less readable (Experiment 4) compared to critical items of the nonstudied
list. Based on these findings, Karpicke et al. ruled out Whittlesea’s claim that surprise was
experienced for the critical items as well as the claim that the surprise led to discrepancy for
those items and increased false memory for them.
Cleary et al. (2007) also discounted the discrepancy attribution account using the
structural regularity hypothesis. According to their structural regularity hypothesis,
knowledge of structural regularity and reliance on such knowledge during learning might
enhance learning of new information. Based on this hypothesis, orthographically regular
nonwords should be better remembered than orthographically irregular nonwords. Thus, the
higher false alarm rate of the orthographically regular nonwords compared to that of the
orthographically irregular nonwords (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a) is
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inconsistent with the structural regularity hypothesis.
Cleary et al. (2007) conducted a series of experiments with a set of stimuli they
constructed using strings of words (Experiment 1a) and line drawings (Experiment 1b) and
stimuli from Whittlesea and Williams (1998; i.e., words, and orthographically regular versus
irregular nonwords for Experiment 1c) as recognition probes. Cleary et al. were able to
replicate findings from Whittlesea and Williams (1998, 2000, 2001a), showing the higher
false alarm rate (as well as higher hit rate) of orthographically regular nonwords compared to
that of orthographically irregular nonwords or that of words only in selective experiments.
These experiments used the same materials and procedure from Whittlesea and Williams
(Experiment 2) or the modified procedures, without either the pronunciation task or the LDT
on the recognition probe prior to the recognition judgment (Experiments 3a and 3b,
respectively). These replications corroborate the discrepancy attribution account.
However, in other experiments, Cleary et al. (2007) failed to replicate the higher
false alarm rate of orthographically regular nonwords compared to that of irregular nonwords,
although they were able to replicate the higher false alarm rate of orthographically regular
nonwords to that of words. Cleary et al. emphasized the importance of the comparison of
orthographically regular nonwords and irregular nonwords for a number of reasons. They
argued that, although the comparison of orthographically regular nonwords and words has
been reported repeatedly (e.g., Greene, 2004; Whittlesea & Williams, 2000, 2001a, 2001b),
the comparison of orthographically regular and irregular nonwords has not. Furthermore, they
suggested that the higher false alarm rate of orthographically regular nonwords than that of
words is consistent with the pseudoword effect (Greene, 2004) and does not argue against the
structural regularity hypothesis.
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Cleary et al. (2007) found comparable rates of false alarms for the items that
functionally correspond to the categories of “orthographically regular nonwords” and
“orthographically irregular nonwords” in a number of experiments. Those experiments had
recognition probes that were strings of words (Experiment 1a) or line drawings (Experiment
1b) or stimuli from Whittlesea and Williams (1998) with procedural modifications
(Experiment 1c). They also failed to find an effect of discrepancy when participants were not
asked to perform either the pronunciation task or the LDT prior to the recognition judgment
(Experiment 3c) or were asked to engage in a secondary articulatory suppression task during
the recognition test (Experiment 3d). Instead, in those experiments, they found no difference
on false alarm rates between regular nonwords (by their definition, meaningless items with
structural regularity) and irregular nonwords (meaningless items without structural regularity).
They also found higher hit rates for regular nonwords compared to that of irregular nonwords.
They interpreted these findings as evidence supporting the structural regularity hypothesis.
Based on their findings, Cleary et al. (2007) argued that the discrepancy effect might
be driven by phonological factors and confounded with higher inter-stimulus similarity of
nonstudied orthographically regular nonwords to the rest of studied stimuli compared to
nonstudied orthographically irregular nonwords or words. Higher inter-stimulus similarity of
nonstudied orthographically regular nonwords to the rest of studied stimuli has been found to
increase false memory (Westbury, Buchanan, & Brown, 2002). Indeed, when inter-stimulus
similarity was controlled, they found lower false alarm rates for nonwords with a higher
number of orthographic neighbors compared to nonwords with a lower number of
orthographic neighbors and comparable hit rates between the two types of nonwords
(Experiment 5). Again, these patterns of results suggest better old-new discrimination for
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regular nonwords than irregular nonwords, which supports the structural regularity
hypothesis and discounts the discrepancy attribution account.
Given the opposing patterns of data and their interpretations, the generality of
discrepancy in RM seems undetermined. For example, even though Cleary et al. (2007)
discounted the generality of the discrepancy effect with the orthographically regular
nonwords, they admitted that their findings and interpretations do not account for the
mechanism underlying the discrepancy effect in the sentence-with-a-pause paradigm
(Whittlesea & Williams, 2001b). Thus, one aim of the current project is to test the generality
of discrepancy in RM with materials and paradigms not used previously.
1.5 Counter-arguments for Discrepancy Effects in Prospective Memory
The role of discrepancy in PM can also be questioned. Though suggestive, the small
number of existing studies on discrepancy and PM are subject to criticisms that discrepancy
is not the only explanation for the results (because discrepancy was induced by high
familiarity of PM cues relative to nontargets, Guynn & McDaniel, 2007) or that the attempts
to manipulate discrepancy in the PM task are not comparable to that discussed by Whittlesea
and colleagues (because participants could have been aware of the source of discrepancy,
Breneiser & McDaniel, 2006). Currently, Lee and McDaniel’s (2013) finding is the most
convincing evidence suggesting that, within a PM context, discrepancy might be attributed as
significance, thereby leading to the search for the source of that significance and enhancing
PM performance. However, that experiment examined the effect of discrepancy only on PM
performance. The discrepancy attribution account claims that the same discrepancy can lead
to different attributions in different contexts (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a), yet no project
has investigated if the identical or even comparable manipulations of discrepancy can
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influence both RM and PM. Thus, a second objective of the current project is to test if a
similar manipulation of discrepancy can lead to different attributions (e.g., familiarity in an
RM task context and significance in a PM task context), thereby influencing both RM and
PM performance.
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Chapter 2: Overview of Experiments of the
Current Project
A number of factors pose challenges to designing a convincing experimental
paradigm that can address the objectives stated above. The challenges arise because
paradigms that tested discrepancy in RM often induced discrepancy by manipulating (1)
stimulus characteristics (2) in very specific settings, both of which are difficult to incorporate
into a PM task. Whittlesea and Williams (1998, 2001a) argued that they elicited discrepancy
for orthographically regular nonwords and pseudo-homophones and that discrepancy
increased false alarms for orthographically regular nonwords and pseudo-homophones
compared to words. The former types of items, along with words, could be used as PM cues.
However, even if the PM cues of the former types exhibit higher PM performance than the
PM cues of words, an interpretational problem would arise. That higher PM performance
could be caused by discrepancy, which presumably increased false alarm rates in RM, or by a
factor other than discrepancy. For instance, different characteristics of orthographically
regular nonwords compared to that of words could lead to more elaborate encoding of
orthographically regular nonwords. Participants might attempt a more elaborate encoding of
orthographically regular nonwords because the relatively less-fluent processing of those items,
compared to that of words, could lead participants to perceive that searching for PM cues of
orthographically regular nonwords is more challenging. This interpretational problem limits
the incorporation of Whittlesea’s paradigms that elicited discrepancy for items with specific
characteristics into a PM task.
Another way to induce discrepancy is via procedural techniques. For example,
Whittlesea and Williams (2001b) induced discrepancy by manipulating the presence of a
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pause inserted between words within a sentence with varying levels of semantic predictability.
Their manipulation led to results consistent with the discrepancy attribution account: words
with discrepancy elicited by procedural techniques showed higher hit and false alarm rates
than words with no discrepancy. Such a manipulation of discrepancy could eliminate the
interpretational problem discussed above. However, when researchers attempted to utilize
this paradigm with a PM task (Lee & McDaniel, unpublished data), they were faced with
another interpretational problem. The presence of a pause, that Whittlesea and Williams used
to manipulate discrepancy, created a confound. Specifically, the pause could have allowed a
longer time for participants to process PM cues in the discrepant condition than in the
nondiscrepant condition (that had no pause). If so, the pause could have subsequently
enhanced PM performance in the discrepancy condition by allowing more processing time (or
monitoring) of PM cues rather than by inducing discrepancy per se.
2.1 Overview of Experiments 1a and 1b
However, other procedural techniques that manipulate processing fluency could be
used to elicit discrepancy without the interpretational problems discussed above. Such
techniques have been used to induce discrepancy in a PM paradigm (e.g., masked priming,
Lee & McDaniel, 2013). Based on these findings, I used a paradigm that manipulated
processing fluency in order to create discrepancy. More specifically, I manipulated
processing fluency of a particular set of test probes, either easy or difficult, as well as
processing fluency of other probes within which the particular set was embedded, either easy
or difficult. Doing so led to some conditions having fluency consistent across test probes (all
easy or all difficult), thus, having no discrepancy, whereas other conditions having fluency
inconsistent across test probes (some easy and some difficult), thus, having discrepancy.
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To test the generality of the discrepancy effect in RM (Experiment 1a) and the
generality of the discrepancy effect in PM (Experiment 1b), I adapted a processing fluency
paradigm with a perceptual mask from Whittlesea et al. (1990). Whittlesea et al. used a
perceptual mask (i.e., layer of dots with a varying density) to manipulate processing fluency
of test probes and showed that more fluently processed test probes were judged with a higher
familiarity than less fluently processed probes. Therefore, I also used a perceptual mask (i.e.,
a string of symbols) to manipulate processing fluency in the current project. Some test probes
were covered with a perceptual mask that made the identification of the probes relatively
difficult whereas other test probes were not covered with a perceptual mask which made the
identification relatively easy. For example, to make the identification difficult, for a probe
presented in black font on a white background, a perceptual mask composed of a string of
white symbols (@#$%&*?8) was laid over the probe. Doing so led the difficult probes to
look as if some parts of the probe in black were erased (because of the coverage by white
dots). For the easy probes, this layer of white symbols was absent. To make the presence of
perceptual mask less obvious, both the easy and difficult probes were covered by a layer of
colored (e.g., red) symbols (@#$%&*?8).
In addition to the modified perceptual mask, the current project implemented the
masked priming to manipulate processing fluency. Extensive research exists showing the
effect of masked priming on processing fluency (e.g., Forster & Davis, 1984; Rajaram &
Neely, 1992; Weldon, 1991). The advantage with the use of masked priming is that it has
been found to enhance processing fluency without participants being aware of the source of
that fluency, which is a critical component for both the fluency attribution account and the
discrepancy attribution account. As described previously, both views argue that only the
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enhanced fluency (by the fluency attribution account) or discrepant fluency (by the
discrepancy attribution account) of its source being unidentified can be falsely attributed as
familiarity. In the current project, test probes paired with no perceptual mask were primed
with identity primes to further facilitate the processing of the probes whereas test probes
paired with the perceptual mask (of white symbols) were primed with disrupting primes to
further hinder the processing of the probes.
Combining those two techniques allowed Experiment 1a to investigate the role of
fluency by comparing RM performance on the easy probes (with no perceptual mask and the
identity prime) to the difficult probes (with the difficult perceptual mask and the disrupting
prime). Also, such techniques allowed for the investigation of the role of discrepancy in PM.
The easy (or difficult) probes embedded among the difficult (or easy) probes were considered
as the discrepant probes whereas the easy (or difficult) probes embedded among the easy (or
difficult) probes were considered as the nondiscrepant probes.
According to the discrepancy attribution account (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998,
2001a), discrepancy can give rise to familiarity in a recognition task context and that
familiarity can increase the likelihood of responding “old” on a recognition judgment of
discrepant items. Whittlesea and colleagues mostly focused on the analysis of false alarm
rates when observing the discrepancy effect in paradigms that manipulated discrepancy by
stimulus characteristics because, in such paradigms, baseline hit rates differed between items
that were discrepant and nondiscrepant, making the analysis of hit rates less informative (e.g.,
Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). Indeed, when discrepancy was manipulated by factors other
than characteristics of recognition probes, such as predictability of a sentence stem and the
presence of pause (Whittlesea & Williams, 2001b), the discrepancy increased the rates of
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both hits and false alarms. Given that Experiment 1a manipulated discrepancy as a function
of perceptual mask and masked priming (not by stimulus characteristics), the discrepancy
effect is expected to be observed on both hit and false alarm rates in the current project. More
specifically, higher false alarm and hit rates should be observed on the discrepant probes
compared to the nondiscrepant probes for experiments that test RM (Experiment 1a). By
contrast, according to the fluency attribution account, higher false alarm and hit rates should
be observed on the easy probes compared to the difficult probes.
According to the discrepancy-plus-search account (McDaniel et al., 2004; Lee &
McDaniel., 2013), discrepancy can give rise to significance, instead of familiarity, for
discrepant items in a PM task context. This significance then serves as an exogenous cue,
initiating the search for the source of significance. The search consequently increases
likelihood of the recognition of PM cue and the retrieval of PM intention. Thus, in an
experiment that tests PM performance (Experiment 1b) higher PM performance is expected
for the discrepant PM cues compared to the nondiscrepant PM cues.
2.2 Overview of Experiment 2
Experiment 2 also tested the generality of the discrepancy effect in RM. Instead of
using the modified perceptual mask used for Experiments 1a and 1b, Experiment 2 used high
and low frequency words, in addition to the masked priming, to manipulate processing
fluency. The reasoning was that participants would have different expectations for how
fluently high and low frequency words should be processed, based on their pre-experimental
experience with those words. These expectations can be met or violated by the
implementation of facilitative or disruptive primes. For example, participants might find the
increase in processing fluency by an identity prime more discrepant than the decrease in
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processing fluency by a disrupting prime for low frequency words because they expect those
words to be processed less fluently. For high frequency words, on the other hand, participants
might find the decrease in processing fluency by a disrupting prime more discrepant than the
increase in processing fluency by an identity prime because they expect those words to be
processed more fluently.
Thus, in Experiment 2, low frequency words with the identity prime and high
frequency words with the disrupting prime should show higher false alarm rates than low
frequency words with the disrupting prime and high frequency words with the identity prime,
respectively. Furthermore, considering that combining high and low frequency words with
the masked priming has an advantage of allowing discrepancy to be present or absent within
the same stimulus type (e.g., low frequency words being either discrepant or nondiscrepant
depending on the type of primes), the discrepancy effect is expected to be observed also on
hit rates. More specifically, higher hit rates should be observed on low frequency words with
the identity prime and high frequency words with the disrupting prime than on low frequency
words with the disrupting prime and high frequency words with the identity prime,
respectively. By contrast, according to the fluency attribution account, higher false alarm and
hit rates should be observed on the probes with the identity prime compared to the probes
with the disrupting prime, independent of word frequency (see, however, Kinoshita, 1995, for
evidence of greater repetition priming for low frequency words relative to high frequency
words).
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Chapter 3: Experiment 1a
There are more experiments examining the effect of discrepancy on RM (e.g., Cleary
et al., 2007; Whittlesea, 1993; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b) than on
PM (Breneiser & McDaniel, 2006; Guynn & McDaniel, 2007; Lee & McDaniel, 2013;
McDaniel et al., 2004; Thomas & McBride, 2015). Experiments 1a and 1b attempted to
demonstrate that the proposed paradigm can induce discrepancy by mismatching the expected
processing fluency to the experienced processing fluency. Experiment 1a tested if such
induction of discrepancy can give rise to familiarity and thus influence RM performance of
discrepant items, whereas Experiment 1b tested if such discrepancy can give rise to
significance and thus influence PM performance of discrepant items.
In Experiment 1a, participants studied a list of words and nonwords. During the test
phase, participants were asked to make a recognition judgment on a test probe. The
perceptual processing fluency of studied and nonstudied test probes was manipulated by
utilizing a perceptual mask and masked prime. There were two levels of processing fluency
of test probes. Easy probes were paired with no perceptual mask and the identity prime
whereas difficult probes were paired with the difficult perceptual mask and the disrupting
prime. For some groups of participants, the processing fluency of a particular set of test
probes (hereafter referred to as critical item difficulty; easy or difficult) differed from the
processing fluency of the rest of the test probes (hereafter referred to as noncritical item
difficulty; difficult or easy, respectively). These groups were considered to be in discrepant
conditions because the mismatching processing fluency of critical items, compared to that of
the noncritical items, is supposed to elicit discrepancy for the critical items. In other groups,
all test items, both the critical items and the noncritical items, were of the same processing
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fluency, either easy or difficult. These groups were considered to be in nondiscrepant
conditions because the matching processing fluency of critical items to that of noncritical
items is supposed to elicit no discrepancy for the critical items.
Critical items were every 17th and 18th of test probes preceded by 16 noncritical items.
Such a design feature was implemented to encourage participants to build an expectation of
particular processing fluency for critical items after performing a recognition task for a list of
noncritical items with a particular processing fluency. For example, those who made
recognition judgments on a list of test probes (16 noncritical items) that were perceptually
fluent presumably would develop the expectation that the subsequent test probes would be
easy to process. This expectation would be met by easy critical items, eliciting no
discrepancy, or would be violated by difficult critical items, eliciting discrepancy. When the
expected processing fluency is difficult, difficult critical items would elicit no discrepancy
and easy critical items would elicit discrepancy.
Whittlesea and colleagues (e.g., Whittlesea & William, 1998) implemented a LDT or
a pronunciation task prior to a recognition judgment of a test probe to emphasize the
processing fluency of test probes in paradigms that tested effects of discrepancy on
familiarity judgments. Thus, Experiment 1 also implemented a LDT prior to making a
recognition judgment of each test probe. Implementation of a LDT in Experiment 1a would
emphasize the processing fluency manipulation of test probes. Furthermore, the
implementation of a LDT would provide measures to test the efficacy of the processing
fluency manipulation, independent of whether or not discrepancy can affect recognition
performance of test probes. Successful manipulation of processing fluency with the
perceptual mask and masked priming would lead to faster RTs and higher accuracy for the
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easy probes compared to the difficult probes in the LDT performed immediately prior to
making a recognition judgment.
With the processing fluency manipulation, discrepancy should occur for the critical
items with mismatching processing fluency (i.e., easy probes embedded within a list of
difficult probes and difficult probes embedded within a list of easy probes) compared to that
of the noncritical items, instead of for the critical items with matching processing fluency (i.e.,
easy probes embedded within a list of easy probes and difficult probes embedded within a list
of difficult probes). If discrepancy gives rise to familiarity in the recognition context, then
critical items with discrepancy should be experienced as more familiar than critical items
with (relatively) no discrepancy. Such enhancement in familiarity of critical items with
discrepancy should increase the endorsement of them as a previously presented item, thereby
increasing hits for studied critical items and false alarms for nonstudied critical items that
were in the discrepant conditions compared to those in the nondiscrepant conditions. In other
words, if the effect of discrepancy was to be observed, I would find a crossover interaction of
critical item difficulty and list difficulty (which refers to the difficulty of noncritical items) on
hit and false alarm rates of critical items (see Figure 1 for the predicted pattern of results).
By contrast, if fluency were the underlying mechanism that gives rise to familiarity, a
main effect of critical item difficulty with no interaction would be observed on hit and false
alarm rates of critical items (see Figure 2). More specifically, the main effect of critical item
difficulty will show higher hit and false alarm rates of easy probes compared to that of
difficult probes, independent of the list difficulty. For the noncritical items, a main effect of
list difficulty with higher hit and false alarm rates for easy noncritical items would be
observed based on the fluency attribution account, independent of the critical item difficulty
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(see Figure 3).

Figure 1. Predicted RM performance on the critical items by the discrepancy attribution
account in Experiment 1a. HR = Hit rate, FAR = False alarm rate.
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Figure 2. Predicted RM performance on the critical items by the fluency attribution account
in Experiment 1a. HR = Hit rate, FAR = False alarm rate.
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Figure 3. Predicted RM performance on the noncritical items by the fluency attribution
account in Experiment 1a. HR = Hit rate, FAR = False alarm rate.
Although the discrepancy attribution account does not make a clear prediction for the
recognition performance of noncritical items, one probable prediction is to find no main
effect of noncritical item difficulty on both hit and false alarm rates of noncritical items (see
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Figure 4). This prediction is postulated based on Whittlesea and Williams’ (2001b) finding
that showed no difference between recognition judgments on final words presented without a
pause in the predictive versus consistent sentence stem. Even though final words in the
predictive sentence stem were more predictive, hence, processed more fluently, the
recognition judgments of final words in the predictive sentence stems did not differ from that
of final words in the consistent sentence stems when no pause was inserted prior to the
presentation of final word. Thus, it is also possible to find the same level of recognition
judgments between the easy noncritical items and the difficult noncritical items in
Experiment 1a.
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Figure 4. Predicted RM performance on the noncritical items by the discrepancy attribution
account in Experiment 1a. HR = Hit rate, FAR = False alarm rate.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants and design. The experiment was a 2 (Critical item difficulty;
Easy/Difficult) X 2 (List difficulty; Easy/Difficult) X 2 (Study status; Studied/Nonstudied) X
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2 (Lexicality; Word/Nonword) X 3 (Block type; First/Second/Third study-test block) mixed
design. The critical item difficulty and the list difficulty were between subjects factors.
Ninety-one participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups. There were 22
participants in the difficult critical items in the difficult list group and 22 participants in the
easy critical items in the easy list group, with both groups reflecting the nondiscrepant
condition. There were 19 participants in the easy critical items in the difficult list group and
28 participants in the difficult critical items in the easy list group, both groups reflecting the
discrepant condition.
3.1.2 Materials. A set of 500 words was constructed (Scullin et al., 2010) as a
stimulus set for the LDT. The set contained nouns, verbs, and adjectives with 4-8 letters and
was divided into two subsets. Each subset had mean length of 6.5 and 6.47 and mean Log Hal
Frequency (Balota et al., 2007) of 8.51 and 8.54. When one subset was used for word trials of
the LDT, the other was used for nonword trials and this was counterbalanced. Nonword trials
were constructed by changing the location of some letters from the base word or replacing
some letters with a new letter(s). All nonwords were pronounceable. From these subsets, 6
lists of 36 words and 36 nonwords were constructed. With counterbalancing, half of these
lists were used as study lists and the other half were used as nonstudied lists. Processing
fluency defined as critical item difficulty and list (noncritical items) difficulty were
manipulated by implementing two measures described below for both Experiments 1a and 1b.
Both easy and difficult test probes were presented in black font on a white
background and a randomly generated string of colored (e.g., red) symbols (@#$%&*?8) was
layered over them. The number of symbols matched that of the LDT probe and the color of
layer was refreshed for each probe from four possible options (red, blue, brown, green). For
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difficult items, another layer of white symbols was inserted below the above-mentioned
colored symbol layer (and above the black probe). Doing so led the difficult items to look as
if white dots and colored symbols were masking some parts of the LDT probe in black font.
Additionally, a non-pronounceable string of letters was used as a perceptually disrupting
prime for difficult items with only the first and last letters of prime being the same as the
LDT probe. For easy items, the white symbol layer was absent, thus, was less obscured
visually, and the LDT probe itself was used as the identity prime (see Figure 5 for an
example).

Figure 5. An example of stimulus presentation in Experiments 1a and 1b. The bottom of the
figure depicts how each stimulus was constructed. Only the product of such construction,
depicted above the equal sign, was presented to the participants. Dashed box indicates the
common component of the stimulus presentation. The gray background is used to visualize
the white layer of symbols. Easy item = a stimulus with no white layer of symbols + the
identity prime. Difficult item = a stimulus with a white layer of symbols + the perceptually
disrupting prime.
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3.1.3 Procedure. Each participant performed three blocks of study and test phases
with new study and distractor lists for each block. At the beginning of each block,
participants were told to try to memorize the list of items to be presented. During the study
phase of each block, a fixation signal of ******** was presented for 500 msec prior to each
study item that was presented in black font in the white background. Each study item was
presented for two seconds. A blank screen was presented for one second in between the study
item and the subsequent fixation signal. Items from the study list(s) were presented randomly
for each participant. Once participants completed studying the 72 items in each block (36
words and 36 nonwords), they engaged in a 90-second-long verbal distractor task (adapted
and modified from the reading with distraction from Connelly, Hasher, & Zacks, 1991) to
empty information from their working memory.
After the distractor task and prior to the first testing phase, the instruction for the
LDT (that would be performed for each recognition probe) was provided. Participants were
asked to decide whether a string of letters was a word or nonword by pressing the key labeled
“y” for words and the “n” key for nonwords. The instruction was followed by a few practice
trials with feedback on response accuracy and speed. For each practice LDT trial, a forward
pattern mask (********) was presented for 250 msec followed by an appropriate prime of 45
msec. The practice trials were presented in the same manner as the actual test trials (e.g., a
probe in black covered with the difficult perceptual mask that was overlaid with colored
symbols with a disrupting prime as a difficult item) with no discrepancy. Half of the practice
trials were words and the other half were pronounceable nonwords. All of the practice trials
were items that were not studied or tested.
Upon completing the practice trials of the LDT, participants were told that the testing
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phase for recognition memory was about to begin. All of 72 studied items (36 words and 36
nonwords) within each block with the same number of distracters (36 words and 36
nonwords) were tested. The studied items and nonstudied items were intermixed pseudorandomly within each testing phase so that no more than four trials of same study status or
lexicality were presented in succession. During the testing phase, participants were first asked
to judge if each item presented on the screen was a word or nonword with an appropriate key
response. Then, they were asked if they remembered previously studying the item. The test
list was constructed such that every 17th and 18th trials were the critical items and the
mismatch/match of processing fluency difficulty of those trials to that of (16) preceding trials
was the factor that induced (or did not induce) discrepancy. For all of the 17th and the 18th
trials, in other words, critical items, study status was counterbalanced so that half of them
were previously studied and the other were nonstudied to minimize a confounding effect of
having two discrepant items sequentially. Furthermore, half of the critical items were words
and the other half were nonwords. Upon completing all three study-test blocks, participants
were asked a series of questions concerning if they were aware of the source of processing
fluency, hence, discrepancy, and were able to attribute the discrepancy to its correct source
(e.g., Whittlesea, 1993).
3.1.4 Data analysis. Data from the participants who commented on the white dot
coverage of probes (suggestive of being aware of the perceptual mask manipulation) or the
blinking of a screen (suggestive of being aware of the priming manipulation) during the postexperimental survey were excluded from the analysis. The reasoning for this exclusion was in
line with the idea that being aware of the source of fluency or discrepancy precludes the
misattribution of fluency or discrepancy to familiarity (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993). Of the 91
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participants that were tested, 7 participants in the difficult critical items in the easy list group,
2 in the easy critical items in the easy list group and 2 in the difficult critical items in the
difficult list group were excluded. This exclusion left 20 participants in the difficult critical
items in the difficult list group, 20 in the easy critical items in the easy list group, 19 in the
easy critical items in the difficult list group, and 21 in the difficult critical items in the easy
list group.
All statistical tests were two-tailed with an alpha level of .05 unless noted otherwise
for all experiments reported below. I report partial eta-squared for the Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) and Cohen’s d as effect size measures where relevant. I also report Bayes
information criterion (BIC) value as the posterior probability of the null hypothesis where
relevant (Masson, 2011; Wagenmakers, 2007). Given the complexity of analyses with
multiple Independent Variables (IVs), all analyses presented main effects first, followed by
simple to higher-degree interactions. Also, for main effects, factors used to manipulate
processing fluency were discussed first. For interactions, factors used to induce discrepancy
were discussed first.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 LDT performance. First, as a manipulation check, I tested whether the processing
fluency manipulation was successful by evaluating LDT performance (see Tables 1 and 2 for
descriptive statistics).
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Table 1.
Mean RTs of correct responses on LDT trials as a function of critical item difficulty,list
difficulty, study status, lexicality, and item type in Experiment 1a
Easy List
Critical Item Difficulty

Easy

Difficult

Difficult List
Easy

Difficult

Critical Items
Word
Studied

1085 (194)

1306 (464) 1066 (160) 1257 (244)

Nonstudied

1138 (133)

1390 (781) 1129 (200) 1364 (481)

1329 (214)

1597 (556) 1351 (256)

1292 (251)

1601 (616) 1404 (272) 1701 (756)

Studied

1031 (133)

1175 (447) 1262 (168) 1233 (185)

Nonstudied

1179 (162)

1199 (320) 1399 (230) 1374 (318)

Studied

1424 (157)

1451 (471) 1659 (346) 1702 (567)

Nonstudied

1352 (157)

1455 (429) 1645 (361) 1805 (828)

Nonword
Studied
Nonstudied

1605 (597)

Noncritical Items
Word

Nonword

Note. RTs are in msec. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2.
Mean accuracy of LDT responses as a function of critical item difficulty, list difficulty, study
status, lexicality, and item type in Experiment 1a
Easy List
Critical Item Difficulty

Easy

Difficult

Difficult List
Easy

Difficult

Critical Items
Word
Studied

.98 (.05)

.91 (.07)

.99 (.03)

.90 (.09)

Nonstudied

.96 (.06)

.86 (.14)

.95 (.06)

.88 (.12)

.89 (.11)

.83 (.12)

.81 (.14)

.85 (.16)

.94 (.06)

.92 (.12)

.94 (.13)

.91 (.10)

Studied

.95 (.06)

.92 (.09)

.87 (.09)

.87 (.10)

Nonstudied

.91 (.07)

.88 (.10)

.81 (.11)

.81 (.12)

Studied

.92 (.08)

.86 (.12)

.85 (.13)

.89 (.11)

Nonstudied

.95 (.12)

.91 (.08)

.87 (.12)

.90 (.09)

Nonword
Studied
Nonstudied
Noncritical Items
Word

Nonword

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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LDT RTs of noncritical items. Mean raw LDT RTs of noncritical items were entered
into a 2 (Critical item difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2
(Study status: Studied/Nonstudied) x 2 (Lexicality: Word/Nonword) mixed ANOVA with the
critical item difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables (the block type was
collapsed across three blocks)1. There was a main effect of list difficulty, F (1, 76) = 9.13,
MSE = 448760.01, p = .003, ηp2 = .11, such that LDT responses were faster for the easy items
(M = 1283 msec) than for the difficult items (M = 1510 msec), showing that the processing
fluency manipulation was successful. There was a main effect of study status, F (1, 76) =
12.08, MSE = 22947.42, p = .001, ηp2 = .14, such that LDT responses were faster for the
studied items (M = 1367 msec) than for the nonstudied items (M = 1426 msec). There was a
main effect of lexicality, F (1, 76) = 103.585, MSE = 83953.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .577, such that
LDT responses were faster for words (M = 1232 msec) than for nonwords (M = 1562 msec).
The interaction of critical item and list difficulty was not significant, F < 1. There
was a marginally significant interaction of list difficulty by study status, F (1, 76) = 3.729,
MSE = 22947.42, p = .057, ηp2 = .047. Individual contrasts showed that for the difficult list,
LDT responses were faster for the studied items (M = 1464 msec) than for the nonstudied
items (M = 1556 msec), F (1, 76) = 9.74, MSE = 17818.35, p = .002, although for the easy
list, LDT responses did not differ between studied (M = 1270 msec) and nonstudied items (M
= 1296 msec), F < 1. There was a marginal interaction of list difficulty by lexicality, F (1,
76) = 2.924, MSE = 83953.90, p = .091, ηp2 = .037. Individual contrasts showed that LDT
responses were faster for the easy list than for the difficult list, whether for words (Ms = 1146

1

Similar analyses were conducted separately for words and for nonwords, instead of having
“lexicality” as a factor, throughout the experiment where appropriate. The results of those
analyses were consistent with the results of analyses with “lexicality” as a factor.
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and 1317 msec, respectively) or for nonwords (Ms = 1421 and 1702 msec, respectively), Fs >
24.28. There was an interaction of study status by lexicality, F (1, 76) = 12.83, MSE =
17818.35, p = .001, ηp2 = .144. Individual contrasts showed that LDT responses were faster
for the studied words (M = 1175 msec) than for the nonstudied words (M= 1288 msec), F (1,
76) = 28.67, MSE = 171818.35, p < .001, although LDT responses for nonwords did not
differ as a function of study status (Ms = 1559 and 1564 msec for the studied and nonstudied
nonwords, respectively), F < 1.
There was a three-way interaction of critical item difficulty by study status by
lexicality on LDT RTs of noncritical items, F (1, 76) = 6.87, MSE = 17818.35, p = .011, ηp2
= .083. Individual contrasts showed that the LDT RTs of noncritical items were faster if they
were previously studied than nonstudied, Fs > 3.36, except for the noncritical items that were
nonwords in the conditions with the difficult critical items (see Figure 6). LDT RTs of
noncritical items that were nonwords in the conditions with the difficult critical items did not
differ whether they were previously studied (M = 1541 msec) or not (M = 1499 msec), F <
1.94. . No other main effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 1.6.
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Figure 6. RTs of LDT of noncritical items as a function of critical item difficulty, study
status, and lexicality in Experiment 1a. Error bars denote standard errors.
LDT accuracy of noncritical items. Mean LDT accuracy of noncritical items was also
entered into a 2 (Critical item difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x
2 (Study status: Studied/Nonstudied) x 2 (Lexicality: Word/Nonword) mixed ANOVA with
the critical item difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables. There was a
main effect of list difficulty, F (1, 76) = 8.717, MSE = .028, p = .004, ηp2 = .103, such that
LDT accuracy was higher for the easy items (M = .91) than for the difficult items (M = .86),
showing that the processing fluency manipulation was successful. There was a main effect of
study status, F (1, 76) = 4.61, MSE = .001, p = .035, ηp2 = .057, such that LDT accuracy was
higher for the studied items (M = .89) than for the nonstudied items (M = .88).
The interaction of critical item difficulty by list difficulty was not significant, F (1,
76) = 2.28, MSE = .028, p = .135. There was an interaction of list difficulty by study status, F
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(1, 76) = 6.79, MSE =.001, p = .011, ηp2 = .082. Individual contrasts showed that LDT
accuracy was higher for the studied items (M = .87) than for the nonstudied items in the
difficult list (M = .85), F (1, 76) = 4.61, MSE = .001, p = .005, although study status did not
affect the LDT accuracy of the easy list (Ms = .91), F < 1. There was an interaction of list
difficulty by lexicality, F (1, 76) = 5.71, MSE =.007, p = .019, ηp2 = .07. Individual contrasts
showed that LDT accuracy was higher for nonwords (M = .88) than for words (M = .84)
when they were difficult items, F (1, 76) = 64.0, MSE = .001, p < .001, and when they were
easy items (Ms = .92 and .91 for nonwords and words, respectively), F (1, 76) = 4.0, MSE
= .001, p = .05. There was an interaction of study status by lexicality, F (1, 76) = 80.46, MSE
=.001, p < .001, ηp2 = .514. Individual contrasts showed that LDT accuracy was higher for
studied words (M = .90) than for nonstudied words (M = .86), F (1, 76) = 64.0, MSE = .001,
p < .001, and for nonstudied nonwords (M = .91) than for studied nonwords (.88), F (1, 76) =
36.0, MSE = .001, p < .001. No other main effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 1.3.
LDT RTs of critical items. Next, I analyzed the LDT performance of critical items for
the completeness of the analyses. However, caution is needed in interpreting these data,
especially that of RTs, considering the limited number (maximum of 12) of observations per
cell. Mean raw LDT RTs of critical items were entered into a 2 (Critical item difficulty:
Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (Study status: Studied/Nonstudied) x 2
(Lexicality: Word/Nonword) mixed ANOVA with the critical item difficulty and list
difficulty as between-participant variables. There was a main effect of critical item difficulty,
F (1, 76) = 9.33, MSE = 550430.64, p = .003, ηp2 = .109, such that LDT RTs were faster for
the easy items (M = 1224 msec) than for the difficult items (M = 1478 msec), showing that
the processing fluency manipulation was successful. There was a marginally significant main
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effect of study status, F (1, 76) = 3.56, MSE = 62839.45, p = .063, ηp2 = .045, such that LDT
RTs were faster for the studied items (M = 1324 msec) than for the nonstudied items (M =
1377 msec). There was a main effect of lexicality, F (1, 76) = 57.55, MSE = 99784.16, p
< .001, ηp2 = .43, such that LDT RTs were faster for words (M = 1217 msec) than for
nonwords (M = 1485 msec). No other main effects or interactions were significant, including
the interaction of critical item difficulty by list difficulty, Fs < 1.5.
LDT accuracy of critical items. Mean LDT accuracy of critical items was also
entered into a 2 (Critical item difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x
2 (Study status: Studied/Nonstudied) x 2 (Lexicality: Word/Nonword) mixed ANOVA with
the critical item difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables. There was a
main effect of critical item difficulty, F (1, 76) = 8.19, MSE = .023, p = .005, ηp2 = .097, such
that LDT accuracy was higher for the easy items (M = .93) than for the difficult items (M
= .88), showing that the processing fluency manipulation was successful. There was a main
effect of study status, F (1, 76) = 8.29, MSE = .006, p = .005, ηp2 = .098, such that LDT
accuracy was higher for the nonstudied items (m=.92) than for the studied items (m=.90).
There was a main effect of lexicality, F (1, 76) = 12.76, MSE = .011, p = .001, ηp2 = .144,
such that LDT accuracy was higher for words (M = .93) than for nonwords (M = .89).
The interaction of critical item difficulty by list difficulty was not significant, F < 1.
There was an interaction of critical item difficulty by lexicality, F (1, 76) = 7.76, MSE = .011,
p = .007, ηp2 = .093. Individual contrasts showed that although lexicality did not influence
LDT accuracy of difficult critical items (Ms= .87 and .89 for words and nonwords,
respectively), F < 1, LDT accuracy was higher for easy words (M = .97) than for easy
nonwords (M = .90), F (1, 76) = 19.11, MSE = .005, p < .001. There was an interaction of
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study status by lexicality, F (1, 76) = 51.94, MSE =.005, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. Individual
contrasts found that LDT accuracy was higher for the studied words (M = .95) than for the
studied nonwords (M = .85), F (1, 76) = 80.00, MSE = .005, p < .001, although LDT
accuracy did not differ as a function of lexicality for nonstudied items (Ms = .91 and .93 for
words and nonwords, respectively), F < 3.3. There was a four-way interaction of critical item
difficulty by list difficulty by study status by lexicality, F (1, 76) = 5.61, MSE =.005, p = .02,
ηp2 = .069. No other main effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 2.25.
3.2.2 Recognition memory performance. Hit and false alarm rates were calculated
separately for the critical items (every 17th and 18th trials) as well as for the noncritical items,
in each block in all conditions. The block type was not collapsed across for the analysis of
recognition memory because one can postulate that discrepancy might interact with the block
type. (However, block type and lexicality were collapsed across in Table 3 for ease of
presentation. See Table 3 for descriptive statistics and Figure 7 for the hit rates of the critical
items and Figure 8 for the hit rates of the noncritical items from each group of participants.)
One possibility is that recognition memory might decrease across blocks, due to increasing
interference or fatigue, and consequently the reliance on familiarity in making recognition
judgments might increase across blocks. This possibility would lead to a more pronounced
effect of discrepancy on the later block than on the earlier block. Another possibility is that
the strength of discrepancy might dissipate across blocks, due to increasing experience with
discrepancy. This possibility would lead to a more pronounced effect of discrepancy on the
earlier block than on the later block.
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Table 3.
Mean proportion of ‘Old’ responses of recognition trials as a function of critical item
difficulty, list difficulty, study status, and item type in Experiment 1a
Easy List
Critical Item difficulty

Difficult List

Easy

Difficult

Easy

Difficult

Hit

.70 (.21)

.54 (.19)

.59 (.17)

.57 (.16)

False Alarm

.29 (.18)

.30 (.17)

.32 (.21)

.33 (.16)

Hit

.66 (.16)

.60 (.17)

.52 (.13)

.59 (.16)

False Alarm

.29 (.17)

.33 (.14)

.29 (.12)

.32 (.13)

Critical Items

Noncritical Items

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Figure 7. Actual RM performance on the critical items in Experiment 1a. HR = Hit rate, FAR
= False alarm rate. Error bars denote standard errors.
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Figure 8. Actual RM performance on the noncritical items in Experiment 1a. HR = Hit rate.
Error bars denote standard errors.

Hit rate of critical items. Proportion of correct “old” responses to previously studied
critical items during the recognition test (critical item hit) was entered into a 2 (Critical item
difficulty:

Easy/Difficult)

x

2

(List

difficulty:

Easy/Difficult)

x

2 (Lexicality:

Word/Nonword) x 3 (Block: First/Second/Third) mixed ANOVA with the critical item
difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables. There was a significant main
effect of critical item difficulty, F (1, 76) = 4.83, MSE = .21, p = .031, ηp2 = .06, such that the
easy items were better remembered (M = .65) than the difficult items (M = .55). There was a
marginal main effect of lexicality, F (1, 76) = 3.09, MSE = .082, p = .083, ηp2 = .04, such that
nonwords were better remembered (M = .62) than words (M=.58). There was a main effect of
block type, F (2, 152) = 4.50, MSE = .059, p = .013, ηp2 = .056. Individual contrasts found
that previously studied items were remembered better in the first block (M = .65) than in the
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third block (M = .57), F (1, 152) = 4.27, MSE = .060, p = .04, and equally well in the third
block and in the second block (M = .58), F < 1.
The interaction of critical item difficulty and list difficulty was not significant, F (1,
76) = 2.35, MSE = .21, p = .13. A Bayesian analysis showed weak support for no interaction,
PBIC (H0|D) = .73, according to the guidelines set by Raftery (1995). Even if this interaction
was significant, the pattern of data would not show support for the discrepancy attribution
account because the highest hit rate (of this possible interaction) was observed from the easy
critical items embedded in the easy list (see the far left bar from Figure 7). There was a
marginal interaction of critical item difficulty by lexicality, F (1, 76) = 3.55, MSE = .082, p
= .063, ηp2 = .045. Individual contrasts showed that although hit rates of critical items did not
differ as a function of critical item difficulty for words (Ms = .56 and .60 for the difficult and
easy critical items, respectively, F < 1) or as a function of lexicality among the easy critical
items (Ms = .60 and .70 for words and nonwords, respectively, F (1, 152) = 2.77, MSE = .06,
p = .10), the nonword critical items were better recognized if they were easy (M = .69) than if
they were difficult (M = .55), F (1, 76) = 6.53, MSE = .06, p = .01. No other main effects or
interactions were significant, Fs < 2.63.
False alarm rate of critical items. Proportion of incorrect “old” responses to
nonstudied critical items during the recognition test (critical item false alarm) were entered
into a 2 (Critical item difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2
(Lexicality: Word/Nonword) x 3 (Block: First/Second/Third) mixed ANOVA with the critical
item difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables. There was a main effect of
block, F (2, 152) = 3.10, MSE = .05, p = .048, ηp2 = .04. Individual contrasts showed that the
first block (M = .28) had a marginally lower false alarm rate than the third block (M = .34), F
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(1, 152) = 2.88, MSE = .05, p = .09, but not compared to the second block (.32), F < 1. No
other main effects or interactions were significant, including the interaction of critical item
difficulty by list difficulty, Fs < 1.82. A Bayesian analysis showed positive support for no
interaction, PBIC (H0|D) = .90.
Hit rate of noncritical items. Proportion of correct “old” responses to previously
studied noncritical items during the recognition test (noncritical item hit) was entered into a 2
(Critical item difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (Lexicality:
Word/Nonword) x 3 (Block: First/Second/Third) mixed ANOVA with the critical item
difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables. There was a marginal main
effect of list difficulty, F (1, 76) = 3.89, MSE = .145, p = .052, ηp2 = .05, such that the easy
items were remembered better (M = .63) than the difficult items (M = .56). There was a
significant main effect of block type, F (2, 152) = 29.92, MSE = .015, p < .001, ηp2 = .28,
such that previously studied items were better remembered in the first block (M = .65)
compared to that in the second block (M =.58) and in the third block (M = .55), Fs (1, 152) >
21.78, MSE = .009, ps < .001.
There was a marginally significant interaction of critical item difficulty by list
difficulty, F (1, 76) = 3.73, MSE = .145, p = .057, ηp2 = .05. Individual contrasts found that
for the difficult list (of noncritical items), memory for the noncritical items was higher in the
condition where the difficult critical items were embedded (M = .59) than in the condition
where the easy critical items were embedded (M = .52), F (1, 152) = 5.30, MSE = .009, p
= .02, whereas for the easy list, memory for the noncritical items was higher in the condition
where the easy critical items were embedded (M = .66) than in the condition where the
difficult critical items were embedded (M = .60), F (1, 152) = 4.10, MSE = .009, p = .04.
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Furthermore, in the conditions where the easy critical items were embedded, memory for the
noncritical items was better for the easy list (M = .66) than for the difficult list (M = .52), F
(1, 152) = 21.22, MSE = .009, p < .001. No other main effects or interactions were significant,
Fs < 2.23.
False alarm rate of noncritical items. Proportion of incorrect “old” responses to
previously nonstudied noncritical items during the recognition test (noncritical item false
alarm) was entered into a 2 (Critical item difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty:
Easy/Difficult) x 2 (Lexicality: Word/Nonword) x 3 (Block: First/Second/Third) mixed
ANOVA with the critical item difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables.
There was a marginal main effect of lexicality, F (1, 76) = 3.66, MSE = .027, p = .06, ηp2
= .05, such that words were less falsely recognized (M = .29) than nonwords (M = .32).
There was a main effect of block type, F (2, 152) = 9.96, MSE = .017, p < .001, ηp2 = .12.
Individual contrasts showed that the first block had a lower false alarm rate (M = .27),
compared to the second block (M = .32) and the third block (M = .34); Fs (1, 152) > 14.29,
MSE = .007, ps < .001.
There was no significant interaction of critical item difficulty by list difficulty, F < 1.
There was a significant interaction of lexicality by block type, F (2, 152) = 6.23, MSE = .007,
p = .003, ηp2 = .08. Individual contrasts found that, in the first and second blocks, false alarm
rates for words were lower (Ms = .25 and .29, respectively) than that for nonwords (Ms = .28
and .35), although false alarm rates for words (M = .33) and nonwords (M = .33) did not
differ in the third block; Fs (1, 152) > 9.14, MSE = .007, ps < .003. No other main effects or
interactions were significant, Fs < 2.32.
Given that the recognition judgments were preceded by the LDT judgment and the
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LDT performance was not perfect, I also performed the above mentioned analyses taking the
RM responses only from the correct LDT trials. The results were comparable to what was
reported above, so I will not further discuss this conditional analysis.
Hit rates of critical and noncritical items in discrepant conditions. The above
analyses tested the effect of the processing fluency manipulation separately for the critical
items and the noncritical items and found no evidence of a discrepancy effect on recognition
judgments of critical items. Another way to measure a possible discrepancy effect is to
examine the effects of critical and noncritical item difficulty on recognition judgments of
critical and noncritical items only from the discrepant conditions. When comparing the two
groups of participants in discrepant conditions, theoretically competing predictions can be
made. The fluency attribution account would predict a crossover interaction (see the two bars
in the middle of upper panel in Figures 2 and 3). Given that the critical item difficulty and
the noncritical item difficulty were mismatched for both groups of participants in the
discrepant conditions, the conditional analysis of hit rates of critical and noncritical items
from two discrepant conditions should lead to an interaction of item type by group type. That
interaction would show higher hit rates of critical items from the group of participants who
received the easy critical items in the difficult list than the group of participants who received
the difficult critical items in the easy list and higher hit rates of noncritical items from the
latter group than the former group. According to the discrepancy attribution account,
however, no such interaction is predicted (see the two bars in the middle of upper panel in
Figures 1 and 4). Instead, recognition judgments of noncritical items might not differ
between the groups, leading to no main effect of group type. Furthermore, critical items that
were discrepant should be judged more familiar than noncritical items, and thus, should lead
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to a main effect of item type with a higher familiarity for critical items compared to
noncritical items.
To test these predictions, a conditional analysis was conducted with the dependent
measure of proportion of correct “old” responses to previously studied critical and
noncritical items only from participants in the discrepant conditions (those who received the
easy critical items in the difficult list and the difficult critical items in the easy list).
Proportion of correct “old” responses was entered into a 2 (Group type: the easy critical
items in the difficult list group/ the difficult critical items in the easy list group) x 2 (Item
type: Critical/Noncritical) mixed ANOVA with the group type as the between-participant
variable (see the two bars in the middle of Figures 7 and 8). There was no significant main
effect of group type or main effect of item type, Fs < 1, the latter pattern disfavoring the
discrepancy attribution account2. There was a significant interaction of group type by item
type, F (1, 38) = 15.19, MSE = .005, p < .001, ηp2 = .29. Individual contrasts showed those
who received the easy critical items in the difficult list had a higher hit rate of critical items
and a lower hit rate of noncritical items relative to those who received the difficult critical
items in the easy list, Fs > 4.60. Therefore, these data patterns further corroborate the success
of the processing fluency manipulation. Furthermore, these patterns are consistent with the
higher hit rates of easy critical and noncritical items found in the more comprehensive
ANOVAs above and provide support for the fluency attribution account.
RTs of correct recognition judgments of critical items and noncritical items. Next, I
analyzed the RTs of correct recognition judgments. It is important to note that these data

2

To inform the possibility that there was limited power to detect the discrepancy effect in Ex
periments 1a, 1b and 2, I report the power analyses for the three experiments in the general di
scussion.
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should be interpreted with caution because of the reduced number of observations per cell for
the critical and noncritical items resulting from the less-than-perfect mean accuracy of
recognition performance. The block type was collapsed across three blocks. One participant
was excluded from the analysis because no hit response was made on the word trials from
this participant.
Mean raw RTs of correct recognition judgments of critical items were entered into a
2 (Critical item difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (Study
status: Studied/Nonstudied) x 2 (Lexicality: Word/Nonword) mixed ANOVA with the
critical item difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables (see Table 4 for
descriptive statistics). There was a main effect of list difficulty, F (1, 75) = 5.21, MSE =
324408.86, p = .025, ηp2 = .065, such that correct recognition judgments of critical items
were faster in the conditions with the difficult list (M = 417 msec) than in the conditions with
the easy list (M = 563 msec). There was a main effect of lexicality, F (1, 75) = 5.11, MSE =
96686.35, p = .027, ηp2 = .06, such that correct recognition judgments were faster for words
(M = 450 msec) than for nonwords (M = 529 msec). This main effect was qualified by a
marginal interaction of lexicality by study status, F (1, 75) = 3.14, MSE = 76282.10, p = .080,
ηp2 = .04. Individual contrasts found that recognition judgments were slower for the
nonstudied nonwords (M = 578 msec) than for the studied nonwords (M = 481 msec), F (1,
75) = 4.87, MSE = 76282.10, p = .03, although recognition judgments for the nonstudied
words (M = 444 msec) were not slower than that for the studied words (M = 457 msec), F <
1. No other main effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 1.63.
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Table 4.
Mean RTs of correct responses on recognition trials as a function of critical item difficulty,
list difficulty, study status, lexicality, and item type in Experiment 1a
Easy List
Critical Item Difficulty

Easy

Difficult List

Difficult

Easy

Difficult

Critical Items
Word
Studied

589 (440)

532 (389)

361 (186)

353 (144)

Nonstudied

509 (271)

513 (342)

388 (233)

364 (182)

512 (308)

528 (348)

449 (242)

433 (209)

574 (324)

755 (1035) 522 (328)

462 (188)

Studied

502 (223)

447 (274)

393 (274)

391 (140)

Nonstudied

506 (249)

495 (319)

426 (189)

393 (163)

Studied Item

574 (254)

514 (278)

483 (328)

442 (177)

Nonstudied Item

707 (502)

572 (355)

517 (329)

487 (174)

Nonword
Studied
Nonstudied
Noncritical Items
Word

Nonword

Note. RTs are in msec. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Mean raw RTs of correct recognition judgments of noncritical items were entered
into a 2 (Critical item difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2
(Study status: Studied/Nonstudied) x 2 (Lexicality: Word/Nonword) mixed ANOVA with the
critical item difficulty and list difficulty as between-participant variables. There was a
marginally significant main effect of list difficulty, F (1, 76) = 3.085, MSE = 251282.97, p
= .083, ηp2 = .039, such that correct recognition judgments of noncritical items were faster for
the difficult list (M = 441 msec) than for the easy list (M = 540 msec). There was a main
effect of lexicality, F (1, 76) = 24.38, MSE = 28141.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .243, such that correct
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recognition judgments were faster for words (M = 444 msec) than for nonwords (M = 537
msec). There was a main effect of study status, F (1, 76) = 16.81, MSE = 9404.26, p < .001,
ηp2 = .181, such that correct recognition judgments were faster for the studied probes (M =
468 msec) than for the nonstudied probes (M = 513 msec). These main effects were qualified
by a marginal interaction of study status by lexicality F (1, 76) = 2.85, MSE = 14486.46, p
= .095, ηp2 = .036. Individual contrasts found that recognition judgments were slower for the
nonstudied nonwords (M = 571 msec) than for the studied nonwords (M = 503 msec), F (1,
76) = 12.40, MSE = 14486.46, p < .001, although recognition judgments for the nonstudied
words (M = 455 msec) were not slower than that for the studied words (M = 434 msec), F <
1.22. No other main effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 2.27.
3.3 Discussion
Based on the faster RTs and higher accuracy of LDT for the easy items compared to
the difficult items, it seems that the current paradigm successfully manipulated processing
fluency with the perceptual mask modified from Whittlesea et al. (1990) and the masked
prime. The main effects of processing fluency on hit rates of both critical and noncritical
items (e.g., higher hit rates for the easy probes) also suggest that the manipulation was
successful and provide further evidence for the fluency attribution account (Jacoby & Dallas,
1981). By contrast, the interactions of critical item difficulty and list difficulty on both hit and
false alarm rates of critical items were not significant, thus there was no support for the
discrepancy attribution account (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b). Based
on the LDT data and the main effects of processing fluency on the hit rates of both critical
and noncritical items, the failure to observe an effect of discrepancy on RM in this paradigm
cannot be due to an unsuccessful processing fluency manipulation.
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The main effect of block type on hit rates of both critical and noncritical items
showed decreased performance across blocks, which seemed to reflect interference or fatigue
over time. Decreasing recognition performance across blocks might cause a larger effect of
discrepancy on recognition performance in the later block in which recognition was
presumably more difficult compared to that in the earlier block in which recognition was
relatively easier. This pattern is postulated based on findings that showed more reliance on
discrepancy when the recognition task was more difficult (e.g., Goldinger & Hansen, 2006).
Another possibility for a selective effect of discrepancy on a particular block would be a
stronger effect of discrepancy in the earlier block than in the latter blocks, given that the early
experience of discrepancy might be most potent. Both of these possibilities predict an
interaction of critical item difficulty and list difficulty with block type on both hit and false
alarm rates of critical items. However, the block type did not interact with any of the factors
mentioned above for both hit and false alarm rates of critical items, providing no support for
the aforementioned possibilities of discrepancy influencing recognition.
For noncritical items, I found a main effect of list difficulty that was qualified by an
interaction of critical item difficulty and list difficulty on hit rates. The interaction suggested
a possibility that hit rates were higher for the lists of noncritical items that contained the
critical items of matching difficulty, whether easy or difficult, than the list of noncritical
items that contained the critical items of mismatching difficulty. This pattern suggests that
processing the critical items of mismatching difficulty might hinder recognition judgments of
noncritical items. Conditional analysis of hit rates of both noncritical and critical items only
in discrepant conditions showed that the easy noncritical items had a higher hit rate than the
difficult noncritical items even when critical items of mismatching difficulty interfered with
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recognition judgments. This finding is inconsistent with the prediction of no difference
between the easy and difficult noncritical items, postulated from the discrepancy attribution
account. Rather, along with the higher hit rates of easy critical items, the higher hit rate of
easy noncritical items of the conditional analysis further corroborates that the manipulation of
processing fluency was successful at increasing “old” responses on recognition judgments for
more fluently processed items (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989).
Although higher hit rates were found for both critical and noncritical items that were
easy to process, false alarm rates for the easy items were not higher than that for the difficult
items either for the critical items or the noncritical items. This finding is puzzling because
Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) claimed that processing fluency can influence familiarity
judgments by showing higher rates of both hit and false alarm for more fluently processed
items compared to less fluently processed items. Also, given that fluency can give rise to
familiarity, if the effect of fluency was to be observed on RM, it would be more likely to be
observed on the false alarm rate than on the hit rate, given that the former lacks recollection
and hence is more prone to the influence of familiarity.
Given that the current project (1) used a string of white symbols as a perceptual mask
instead of a layer of dots with varying density that Whittlesea et al. used (Whittlesea, Jacoby,
& Girard, 1990), and (2) overlaid a string of colored symbols across test probes, it is possible
that subjective experience of processing fluency in Experiment 1a might have differed from
that in Whittlesea et al.’s experiments. It is possible that participants in Experiment 1a found
the processing of test probes disfluent because of the unusual layer of colored symbols,
regardless of the level of processing fluency manipulated. However, this possibility is
unlikely, considering the RT measure of LDT that showed faster RTs for the easy items
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compared to that of the difficult items as well as the effect of processing fluency on hit rates.
These RT measures have been used previously as a proxy for processing fluency by
Whittlesea and colleagues (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). Thus, the LDT data do not
support the claim that the processing fluency manipulation of Experiment 1a did not translate
into fluency, and hence, failed to increase false alarm rates.
Rather, it seems more parsimonious to conclude that the processing fluency of
Experiment 1a was successfully manipulated and that fluency had an effect on hit rates but
not on false alarm rates. Indeed, studies exist showing various factors can affect only
recollection (e.g., speed of retrieval) or familiarity (e.g., perceptual matching of study and
test) or both (e.g., study duration) (see Yonelinas, 2002 for a comprehensive review of these
factors). Future research could investigate what aspect(s) of current paradigm allowed
fluency to have an impact on the hit rate but not on the false alarm rate.
Another puzzling pattern in Experiment 1a was that the RTs of recognition
judgments on both critical items and noncritical items in the conditions with the difficult list
were faster than the RTs in the conditions with the easy list. Compared to the range of RTs
reported in the literature (e.g., RTs of recognition judgments in the range of 1000 msec and
RTs of LDT in the range of 600 ~ 800 msec, Duchek & Neely, 1989), the RTs of recognition
judgments were relatively shorter (in the range of 400 ~ 700 msec) and the RTs of LDT were
relatively longer (in the range of 1000 ~ 1800 msec) in Experiment 1a. Perhaps participants
in Experiment 1a were able to think about the upcoming recognition judgments during the
relatively longer period of LDT for the difficult probes, and hence were able to make faster
recognition judgments for the difficult probes. Another possibility is that, given the relative
disfluency of difficult probes, especially the difficult noncritical items, participants might not
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have exhibited enough effort into recognition judgments of the difficult probes which resulted
in faster recognition judgments. This possibility aligns with the lower mean accuracy of
recognition performance of difficult noncritical items.
The other possibility is that the relatively restricted numbers of observations used for
the analyses of correct recognition judgment RTs and the between-participant design of list
difficulty in Experiment 1a somehow generated an artifact. In support of this possibility,
study status and lexicality (within-participant variables) showed significant effects in the
direction consistent with the existing literature. The RTs of correct recognition judgments
were faster for the studied probes than the nonstudied probes (Jou, Matus, Aldridge, Rogers,
& Zimmerman, 2004) and faster for words than for nonwords (Rajaram & Neely, 1992).
Nevertheless, neither of these possibilities can explain why the RTs of recognition judgments
on critical items were slower in the conditions with the easy list than in the conditions with
the difficult list. Unfortunately, the current project cannot distinguish the above mentioned
possibilities.
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Chapter 4: Experiment 1b
As mentioned previously, to perform a PM task, participants have to first recognize a
stimulus as the PM cue at an appropriate time without being explicitly prompted. McDaniel
et al. (2004) suggested that, discrepancy from a stimulus might be attributed as significance,
rather than familiarity, of that stimulus under the PM context. They further suggested that this
significance would initiate the search for the source of that significance and subsequently
lead to the recognition of the PM cue. To test this suggestion, Experiment 1b used the same
processing fluency paradigm Experiment 1a used and incorporated a PM task. The
incorporation of a PM task with the paradigm that did not find a discrepancy effect in RM
(Experiment 1a) was based on the premise that the utility of discrepancy might differ between
PM and RM contexts. To perform a PM task, participants might not search for relevant
information to guide their PM performance because they are absorbed in the ongoing activity.
Furthermore, they might not access helpful information other than significance attributed
from discrepancy to guide their PM performance. To perform a RM task, on the other hand,
participants would actively search for information to guide their familiarity judgment and
could access helpful information for that judgment, in addition to discrepancy, such as
increased processing fluency due to the previous encounter. If the utility of discrepancy in the
former condition is greater than that in the latter condition, it is possible to predict that the
discrepancy-driven PM enhancement is more likely than the discrepancy-driven familiarity
increase (see also Wänke, & Hansen, 2015, for the discussion of utility of perceiving changes
in fluency across different cognitive tasks).
The intriguing prediction above has never been tested because no project has used the
same paradigm to test the effects of discrepancy in PM and RM. Thus, Experiment 1b was
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the first study providing direct evidence regarding whether or not the same discrepancy
manipulation influences PM but not RM. Also, Experiment 1b was the first experiment that
used nonfocal PM cues in conjunction with a discrepancy manipulation. Below, I first briefly
describe the definition of nonfocal PM cues and then the reasoning behind the use of
nonfocal PM cues in Experiment 1b.
According to the multiprocess framework proposed by McDaniel and colleagues
(Einstein et al., 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007; McDaniel et al., 2004), a nonfocal
PM cue refers to a PM cue whose features are not likely processed during the ongoing task
(whereas a focal PM cue refers to a PM cue whose features are likely processed during the
ongoing task). For example, if the ongoing task is to make a lexical decision for a string of
letters, a PM cue of a word with the initial letter “o” will be considered as nonfocal
(compared to a PM cue of a particular word “orange”). Because participants will focus on the
lexical aspect of the presented word during that ongoing task, they do not need to attend to
the initial letter of presented words (in the service of performing the ongoing task). Thus, the
multiprocess framework suggests that for nonfocal PM cues, participants rely on strategic
monitoring processes that are attention demanding, such as constantly checking if a stimulus
for the ongoing task is the PM cue (e.g., McDaniel et al., 2004; Smith, 2003).
However, it is possible to conjecture that discrepancy might have an effect on
nonfocal PM performance. Researchers suggest that strategic monitoring processes demand
limited attentional resources (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; Smith, 2003). If so, sustaining
strategic monitoring processes for all possible PM cues across trials could be challenging. In
support of this, studies using nonfocal PM cues often report PM performance that is lower
than those using focal PM cues (e.g., Scullin et al., 2010, Experiment 4). If monitoring is not
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sustained throughout the PM task, thereby missing a number of PM cues, then discrepancy
could assist the recognition of nonfocal PM cues that were missed by monitoring.
Experiment 1b used the processing fluency paradigm used in Experiment 1a and
manipulated discrepancy by mismatching the expected and the actual difficulty level of
processing fluency of PM cues during an ongoing task of LDT. The expectation (of difficulty
of subsequent LDT trials) was built by having participants respond to a list of LDT trials with
a particular processing difficulty, either easy or difficult. For example, those who responded
to a list of easy LDT trials (that were paired with the identity prime and no perceptual mask
described earlier in Experiment 1a) would presumably develop the expectation that the
subsequent trials would also be easy to process. This expectation would be met by easy PM
cues in the nondiscrepant condition and would be violated by difficult PM cues (that were
paired with the disrupting prime and the difficult perceptual mask) in the discrepant condition.
For the list of difficult LDT trials, the nondiscrepant condition presents the difficult PM cues
and the discrepant condition presents the easy PM cues.
Often, the presence of a ceiling effect is one of the technical difficulties in studying
any performance-enhancing factors in PM. To address this difficulty, Experiment 1b utilized
multiple (six) trials of nonfocal PM cues. With the use of nonfocal PM cues and the difficulty
with sustaining monitoring, PM performance in the nondiscrepant conditions is expected to
be off the ceiling. If discrepancy plays a role in PM, participants should be more likely to
make the PM response of pressing the “q” key while performing an LDT for the discrepant
PM cues than for the nondiscrepant PM cues. In other words, both easy PM cues embedded
in the difficult list and difficult PM cues embedded in the easy list would show higher PM
performance than easy PM cues embedded in the easy list and difficult PM cues embedded in
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the difficult list (see Figure 9 for the predicted pattern of results).

Figure 9. Predicted PM performance by the discrepancy attribution account in Experiment 1b.
To better inform the underlying mechanism(s) of discrepancy-enhanced PM
performance, monitoring costs were measured along with the PM performance. Engagement
in monitoring process is implicated by the relative slowing, monitoring cost, on performance
of ongoing activity in the PM block (in which a PM task needs to be performed in addition to
the ongoing task) compared to the performance of ongoing activity in the control block (in
which only the ongoing task needs to be performed). Thus, in Experiment 1b, participants
were asked to perform a control block of LDT as well as PM blocks. The overall monitoring
costs were measured by comparing the mean RT of nontarget trials (that correspond to
ongoing task trials that are not targets of the PM task) in the PM block to that in the control
block.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Participants and design. The experiment was a 2 (PM cue difficulty;
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Easy/Difficult) X 2 (List (of nontargets) difficulty; Easy/Difficult) X 4 (Block type;
Control/First PM/Second PM/Third PM) mixed design. The block type was the only withinparticipant factor. Eighty-five participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups.
There were 20 participants in the easy PM cue in the difficult list group and 22 in the difficult
PM cue in the easy list group, both being discrepant conditions, and 22 in the difficult PM
cue in the difficult list group and 21 in the easy PM cue in the easy list group, both being
nondiscrepant conditions.
4.1.2 Materials. The same materials were used in Experiment 1b as in Experiment 1a
with the following exception. Two sets of six PM cues were constructed with each set
containing six words that have the same initial letter (husband, heritage, horizon, hero, hemp,
herbal for words beginning with the letter “h”; mood, mundane, minority, monk, marker,
magic for words beginning with the letter “m”). Mean length and Log Hal Frequency of
words were 6 and 8.86 for the “h” set and 5.67 and 8.87 for the “m” set, respectively. Each
participant received a set randomly drawn from the two possible options. Care was taken so
that only the set of six PM cues had the specified initial letter throughout the experiment. All
of PM cues were “yes” trials of LDT that were used as an ongoing task. Processing fluency
defined as PM cue difficulty and list difficulty was manipulated by implementing the
measures described under the Materials section of Experiment 1a.
4.1.3 Procedure. The instruction for LDT was provided and followed by a few
practice trials with feedback on response accuracy and speed. Then, participants performed
the control block of LDT that contained 50 trials, consist of 25 words and 25 nonwords. Upon
completing the control block they were provided with the PM instruction asking them to
press the “q” key if they ever see any words beginning with a specific letter (either “h” or
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“m”) during the experiment. After successfully repeating the PM instructions back to the
experimenter, participants were asked to engage in a distractor task (adjusted for length from
the materials used in Experiment 1a) for five minutes. Then, participants performed three PM
blocks consecutively without being reminded of the PM instruction.
Each of three PM blocks had 164 trials. Two PM cues in each block were presented
on the 107th and 158th trials. For discrepant PM cues, the PM cue difficulty mismatched the
processing difficulty of preceding trials (also referred to as list difficulty). Thus, easy PM
cues embedded in the difficult list (of nontargets) and difficult PM cues embedded in the easy
list were considered discrepant PM cues. Easy PM cues embedded in the easy list and
difficult PM cues embedded in the difficult list were considered nondiscrepant PM cues. Half
of those trials in each block were the yes trial and the other half were the no trial for the LDT.
Immediately after participants made their response for a given trial, the next trial appeared
after a fixation signal. At the end of the third PM block, participants were surveyed with a
series of questions regarding retrospective memory for the PM instructions and the detection
of discrepancy and its attribution.
4.1.4 Data analysis. A total of 85 participants were tested and four of them were
dropped as they commented on the white dot coverage of LDT probes or possible blinking of
the screen, indicative of potentially aware of the processing fluency manipulations. Two
participants from the difficult PM cue in the difficult list group, 1 from the easy PM cue in
the difficult list group, and 1 from the difficult PM cue in the easy list group were excluded.
This exclusion left 19 participants in the easy PM cue in the difficult list group, 20 in the
difficult PM cue in the difficult list group, 21 in the easy PM cue in the easy list group, and
21 in the difficult PM cue in the easy list group.
66

4.2 Results
4.2.1 Prospective memory performance. All participants correctly recalled the PM
instructions; thus, all participants were included in the analysis (cf. McDaniel, Shelton,
Breneiser, Moynan, & Balota, 2011). The proportion of correct PM responses out of six trials
was entered into a 2 (PM cue difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) x
3 (Block type: 1st, 2nd, 3rd) mixed ANOVA with the block type as the within-participant
variable. (See Table 5 and Figure 10 for descriptive statistics. Block type was collapsed
across for the ease of presentation in the table and the figure.) The main effect of PM cue
difficulty, F (1, 77) = .406, MSE = .309, p = .526, ηp2 = .005, and the main effect of list
difficulty, F (1, 77) = .655, MSE = .309, p = .421, ηp2 = .008 were not significant. The
interaction of PM cue difficulty by list difficulty was also not significant, F (1, 77) = .226,
MSE = .309, p = .636, ηp2 = .003. A Bayesian analysis showed positive support for no
interaction on PM performance, PBIC (H0|D) = .90. This pattern of results held whether all PM
responses were considered or only the PM responses on correct LDT trials were considered
(Fs < 1).
Table 5.
Mean proportion of correct PM responses as a function of PM cue and list difficulty in
Experiment 1b
Easy List

Difficult List

Easy PM Cue

.24(.34)

.33(.33)

Difficult PM Cue

.25(.33)

.29(.36)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Figure 10. Actual PM performance in Experiment 1b. Error bars denote standard errors.
If discrepancy is induced by violation of expectation and the expectation can be
subsequently adjusted across trials with experience during the experiment, the magnitude of
discrepancy could decrease over PM trials. With this reasoning, I tested whether there was an
effect of discrepancy on the first PM cue. First PM cue performance was better when it was
embedded in the difficult list of LDT trials than in the easy list, χ²(1, N = 81) = 4.08, p = .04.
PM performance for the first PM cue did not differ as a function of PM cue difficulty, χ²(1, N
= 81) = 1.42, p = .23, or of discrepancy (collapsing across two discrepant and two
nondiscrepant conditions across), χ²(1, N = 81) = 1.09, p = .30.
4.2.2 LDT performance. I next evaluated ongoing task performance to measure
monitoring costs. Mean trimmed LDT RTs and mean LDT accuracy for nontargets were
computed separately for the yes trials and the no trials for each block and analyzed
appropriately. Given that the block type did not have any effect on PM performance in
general, except that the list difficulty had an effect on the first PM cue performance, three PM
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blocks were collapsed across for the analysis of LDT RTs and accuracy.
LDT RTs. Mean trimmed RTs of nontargets (following Einstein et al’s approach,
2005) was entered into a 2 (PM cue difficulty: Easy/Difficult) X 2 (List difficulty:
Easy/Difficult) X 2 (Block type: Control/PM) X 2 (Lexicality: Word/Nonword) mixed
ANOVA with the block type and lexicality as within-participant variables (see Table 6 for
descriptive statistics). There was a significant main effect of list difficulty, F (1, 77) = 36.75,
MSE = 193427.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .323, such that LDT RTs were faster in the easy list (M =
834 msec) than in the difficult list (M = 1130 msec), suggesting that the processing fluency
manipulation was successful. There was a significant main effect of lexicality, F (1, 77) =
113.85, MSE = 18954.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .597, such that LDT RTs were faster for words (M
= 900 msec) than for nonwords (M = 1064 msec). There was a significant main effect of
block type, F (1, 77) = 4.85, MSE = 25930.45, p = .031, ηp2 = .059, such that having a PM
intention slowed down the RTs of LDT during the PM block (M = 1002 msec) than during
the control block (M = 963 msec).
Table 6.
Mean RTs of correct LDT trials of nontargets as a function of PM cue difficulty, list difficulty,
block type, and lexicality in Experiment 1b
Easy List
Easy
Difficult

PM Cue Difficulty
Overall Monitoring Costs
Word
Control Block
776 (116)
750 (128)
PM Block
782 (116)
794 (173)
Nonword
Control Block
898 (175)
899 (197)
PM Block
864 (141)
908 (251)
Note. RTs are in msec. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Difficult List
Easy
Difficult

1022 (188)
1137 (289)

939 (148)
1004 (206)

1284 (402)
1357 (500)

1132 (271)
1169 (310)

There was no significant interaction of PM cue difficulty by list difficulty, F (1, 77)
= 2.25, MSE = 193428.0, p = .14. There was a marginally significant interaction of list
difficulty by block type, F (1, 77) = 3.39, MSE = 25930.45, p = .069, ηp2 = .042. Individual
contrasts found that having a PM intention slowed down RTs of LDT in the difficult list (Ms
= 1094 and 1167 msec for Control and PM blocks, respectively, F (1, 77) = 56.57, MSE =
3814.65, p < .001) but not in the easy list (Ms = 831 and 837 msec for Control and PM blocks,
F < 1). There was an interaction of list difficulty by lexicality, F (1, 77) = 9.31, MSE =
18954.55, p = .003, ηp2 = .11. Individual contrasts showed that LDT RTs were faster for
words than nonwords in the easy list (Ms = 776 and 892 msec for words and nonwords,
respectively) and in the difficult list (Ms = 1025 and 1236 msec for words and nonwords,
respectively), Fs > 72.31. There was an interaction of lexicality by block type, F (1, 77) =
7.11, MSE = 3814.646, p = .009, ηp2 = .085. Individual contrasts showed that monitoring
costs were present for words (Ms = 872 and 929 msec for Control and PM blocks,
respectively) and for nonwords (Ms = 1053 and 1074 msec for Control and PM blocks), Fs >
4.68. No other main effects or interactions were significant, Fs < 2.3.
LDT accuracy. Mean LDT accuracy of nontargets was entered into a (PM cue
difficulty: Easy/Difficult) X 2 (List difficulty: Easy/Difficult) X 2 (Block type: Control/PM)
X 2 (Lexicality: Word/Nonword) mixed ANOVA with the block type and lexicality as
within-participant variables (see Table 7 for descriptive statistics). There was a significant
main effect of list difficulty, F (1, 77) = 43.47, MSE = .017, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, such that
LDT accuracy was higher for the easy list (M = .93) than for the difficult list (M = .84),
suggesting that the processing fluency manipulation was successful. There was a significant
main effect of block type, F (1, 77) = 11.22, MSE = .003, p = .001, ηp2 = .127, such that LDT
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accuracy was higher in the control block (M = .89) than in the PM block (M = .87).
Table 7.
Mean accuracy of LDT responses of nontargets as a as a function of PM cue difficulty, list
difficulty, block type, and lexicality in Experiment 1b
Easy List
Easy
Difficult

PM Cue Difficulty
Overall Monitoring Costs
Word
Control Block
.96 (.04)
PM Block
.94 (.04)
Nonword
Control Block
.94 (.06)
PM Block
.93 (.02)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Difficult List
Easy
Difficult

.94 (.06)
.93 (.04)

.82 (.13)
.75 (.14)

.88 (.06)
.82 (.07)

.91 (.08)
.90 (.11)

.83 (.18)
.87 (.07)

.87 (.09)
.84 (.11)

There was a marginally significant interaction of PM cue difficulty by list difficulty,
F (1, 77) = 3.10, MSE = .017, p = .08 (which was qualified by a three-way interaction
described below). There was a marginal interaction of PM cue difficulty by lexicality, F (1,
77) = 3.44, MSE = .009, p = .067, ηp2 = .083. Individual contrasts showed that in the easy PM
cue conditions, LDT accuracy was lower for words (M = .87) than for nonwords (M = .90) at
a trending level, F (1, 77) = 2.64, MSE = .005, p = .11, although in the difficult PM cue
conditions, LDT accuracy were comparable between words (M = .89) and nonwords (M
= .88), F < 1. There was also an interaction of list difficulty by lexicality, F (1, 77) = 6.96,
MSE = .009, p = .01, ηp2 = .083. Individual contrasts found that for the difficulty list, LDT
accuracy was marginally lower for words (M = .82) than for nonwords (M = .85), F (1, 77) =
3.60, MSE = .005, p = .06, although for the easy list, lexicality did not matter for LDT
accuracy (M = .94 for words and .92 for nonwords, F < 1).
There was an interaction of block type by lexicality, F (1, 77) = 7.56, MSE = .005, p
= .007, ηp2 = .089. Individual contrasts showed that having an PM intention of pressing the
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“q” key for specific words worsened the LDT accuracy of words (Ms = .90 and .86, for
control and PM blocks, respectively), F (1, 77) = 12.96, MSE = .005, p < .001, although such
intention did not influence the LDT accuracy for nonwords (Ms = .89 and .89 for control and
PM blocks, F < 1). This interaction was qualified by a significant three-way interaction of list
difficulty by block type by lexicality, F (1, 77) = 5.49, MSE = .005, p = .022, ηp2 = .067.
Individual contrasts showed that LDT accuracy was higher for nonwords (M= .85) than for
words (M = .79) in the group in which easy PM cues were embedded in the difficult list, F (1,
77) = 6.76, MSE = .005, p = .011, whereas LDT accuracy for words and nonwords were
comparable in the other three groups, Fs < 1.64. No other main effects or interactions, except
the three-way interaction described below, were significant, Fs < 2.6.
There was a marginally significant three-way interaction of PM cue difficulty by list
difficulty by block type, F (1, 77) = 3.05, MSE = .003, p = .085, ηp2 = .038. Planned
comparisons of LDT accuracy of control versus PM blocks for individual groups were
performed to test for monitoring costs. Participants in the difficult PM cue in the difficult list
group had lower LDT accuracy in the PM block relative to the control block, F (1, 77) > 5.25,
MSE = .005, p = .02, whereas LDT accuracy was the same between the control block and the
PM block in the other three groups, Fs < 1.
4.3 Discussion
The RTs and accuracy data of LDT for nontargets in Experiment 1b replicated the
results from Experiment 1a and further corroborated that the processing fluency manipulation
of the paradigm was successful. PM performance in the nondiscrepant conditions was in the
range (Ms = .24 ~ .29) that suggests monitoring was not sustained fully throughout the PM
task. Nevertheless, I did not find any discrepancy-driven enhancement on PM performance.
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In other words, PM performance on discrepant PM cues, whose processing difficulty
mismatched the processing difficulty of the list they were embedded in, did not differ from
PM performance on nondiscrepant PM cues, whose processing difficulty matched that of the
list they were embedded in.
The multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007) suggests that
nonfocal PM cues are supported by monitoring processes rather than spontaneous retrieval.
Considering that the discrepancy-induced significance is suggested as one possible
mechanism for spontaneous retrieval, the use of nonfocal PM cues might have been
detrimental to an attempt to find any discrepancy-enhancement on PM performance. Indeed,
previous reports of discrepancy-enhancement on PM have used only focal PM cues (e.g., Lee
& McDaniel, 2013; Thomas & McBride, 2015). However, as discussed previously, in the
event where monitoring failed to detect nonfocal PM cues, as suggested by relatively low PM
performance in the nondiscrepant conditions (Ms = .24 ~ .29), discrepancy could theoretically
enhance nonfocal PM performance in the discrepant conditions. In the absence of
discrepancy-enhancement on nonfocal PM performance in Experiment 1b, it is premature to
determine whether discrepancy does or does not influence PM performance as McDaniel et al.
(2004) have proposed. Future research comparing the effect of discrepancy on focal versus
nonfocal PM cues may address this issue.
It was suggested that the utility of discrepancy might differ between PM and RM such
that, even with the same paradigm, discrepancy might enhance performance in a PM task but
does not increase familiarity in an RM task. However, no effect of discrepancy was observed
on PM performance in Experiment 1b. Given that both Experiments 1a and 1b did not exhibit
the effect of discrepancy, it is possible that my manipulation of discrepancy was somewhat
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incompatible to what Whittlesea and colleagues have used to induce discrepancy (e.g.,
Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). Based on the RTs and accuracy data of LDT from
Experiments 1a and 1b, I was able to manipulate processing fluency, easy or difficult, with
the perceptual processing paradigm. However, it is unclear whether presenting a series of
items with a particular processing fluency and then presenting an item with the mismatching
processing fluency was sufficient in eliciting discrepancy.
Indeed, the majority of Whittlesea’s work that reported discrepancy effects has
utilized expectations for processing fluency that were built pre-experimentally (e.g.,
Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2001a, 2001b). The majority of his work used three types of
stimulus sets. The first consists of words and nonwords with orthographical
regularity/irregularity, the second set consists of sentences ending with high/low constraint
words, and the third set consists of semantically related/unrelated word pairs. Considering
that most college students have very well-developed lexical and semantic knowledge, one can
infer that from very early in those experiments, Whittlesea’s participants had expectations of
processing fluency of different stimuli and could have readily experienced violations of those
expectations. In support of this possibility, Whittlesea and Williams (1998) showed that the
higher false alarm rate for orthographically regular nonwords was found even when those
nonwords were tested in a recognition memory test without the orthographically irregular
nonwords. The reasoning was that the experience with orthographically irregular nonwords
was unnecessary in finding the discrepancy effect for the orthographically regular nonwords.
There are some findings that can be interpreted under the discrepancy-attribution
framework that have used sets of stimuli that are different from what Whittlesea and
colleagues have used (e.g., picture of faces in Willems et al., 2007). Paradigms of those
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findings manipulated processing fluency of perceptual aspects of test probes, such as
blurring/clearing of pictures (Willems et al., 2007) or decreasing/increasing color contrast
between the test probe and its background (Hansen et al., 2008) and violated the expected
processing fluency of some test probes to elicit discrepancy. The current project also
attempted to elicit discrepancy by using a paradigm that manipulated perceptual processing
fluency of test items and violating the expected processing fluency.
However, although the paradigms mentioned above were all successful at
manipulating processing fluency, they might have differed with the ease of violating the
expected processing fluency. Perhaps, the expectation for processing fluency was built and
violated easier for clear/blurred pictures than stimuli used for the current project because
detecting the difference in processing fluency of items in the former set was easier due to the
greater pre-experimental experience with clear faces. In contrast, it is possible that the
expectation for processing fluency was built rather slowly and violated less easily in the
current project because detecting the difference in processing fluency was more challenging
due to the lack of pre-experimental reference for how fluently items covered with colored
symbols should be processed. Thus, although a small number of studies exist showing effects
of discrepancy using paradigms other than those mentioned above (e.g., Lee & McDaniel,
2013), one explanation for the lack of discrepancy effect in Experiments 1a and 1b is that
discrepancy is most pronounced in the violation of expectations for processing fluency that
are built pre-experimentally. I explore this possibility in Experiment 2.
Experiment 1b focused on how discrepancy could enhance PM performance.
Nevertheless, considering the suggestion that monitoring processes support nonfocal PM cues
(Einstein et al., 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007; McDaniel et al., 2004), I discuss the
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patterns of monitoring processes found in Experiment 1b and their implications to PM in
general. Given that monitoring is resource-demanding (McDaniel et al., 2004; Smith, 2003),
it is possible that participants performing a relatively easier ongoing task (e.g., LDT with a
list of easy trials) might have more resources available to engage in resource-demanding,
monitoring processes than those performing a relatively more difficult ongoing task (e.g.,
LDT with a list of difficult trials). Indeed, Lee and McDaniel (unpublished master’s thesis)
have shown that when participants are engaged in a less demanding ongoing task (e.g.,
category decisions with typical exemplars), they were more likely to engage in monitoring
behaviors and to show higher focal PM performance compared to those engaged in a more
demanding ongoing task (e.g., category decisions with atypical exemplars).
However, in Experiment 1b, opposite patterns of monitoring behaviors were
observed. Based on the overall monitoring costs, participants in the difficult list groups
seemed to engage in more monitoring behaviors than those in the easy list groups. One
explanation for the greater monitoring costs in the difficult list groups is that the perceived
difficulty of ongoing task might have encouraged participants in the difficult list groups to
engage in more monitoring behaviors than those in the easy list groups. In support of this
explanation, studies have found that participants’ metacognition about the ongoing task
difficulty and PM task difficulty can influence monitoring behaviors (e.g., Hicks, Marsh, &
Cook, 2005). More comprehensive research is needed to explain what guides metacognitive
decisions of monitoring behaviors in ongoing tasks with varying difficulty.
Although more overall monitoring costs were observed in the difficult list groups,
PM performance was not greater in those groups than in the easy list groups with no overall
monitoring costs. One possible explanation for the lack of PM enhancement in the difficult
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list groups with more overall monitoring costs is the efficacy of overall monitoring costs.
Scullin et al. (2010) have suggested that overall monitoring costs alone might not be
predictive of PM performance because they might be present even if proximal trials prior to a
PM cue were not monitored. Indeed, when proximal monitoring costs were analyzed
(following Scullin et al.’s approach), comparing the five trials preceding each PM cue to the
corresponding trials in the control block, all four individual groups showed significant
proximal monitoring costs. This pattern resonates with the comparable PM performance
across discrepant and nondiscrepant conditions and is consistent with the idea that monitoring
processes reflected in the proximal monitoring costs support nonfocal PM performance (e.g.,
Scullin et al.).
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Chapter 5: Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, I sought to induce discrepancy by violating expectations for
processing fluency that were built pre-experimentally. There were two factors I manipulated
to induce differential processing fluency and, consequently, discrepancy in Experiment 2:
word frequency and masked priming. Many studies have found that high and low frequency
words differ with the ease of their processing, reflected in faster RTs and higher accuracy of
high frequency words compared to low frequency words in an LDT (e.g., Balota &
Chumbley, 1984; Rajarm & Neely, 1984). Furthermore, previous findings showed that people
judge high frequency words as easier to process (e.g., Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, &
Sanvito, 1989). These findings suggest that people are aware of the processing fluency
advantage of high frequency words and the processing fluency disadvantage of low frequency
words based on their pre-experimental experience. Thus, by using high and low frequency
words as a stimuli set for Experiment 2, I can be more certain that my participants have preexperimental expectations for processing fluency of the experimental stimuli as did
participants in Whittlesea and Williams (1998) for orthographically regular nonwords and
final words in sentences with the varying contextual certainty.
The other factor implemented in Experiment 2 was masked priming. As discussed
previously, studies have shown that masked priming can influence the ease of processing (cf.
Forster & Davis, 1984) and Experiments 1a and 1b showed supporting evidence for this.
While Experiments 1a and 1b had two different types of primes, Experiment 2 had three
types of primes. The first two types of primes were the identity prime of the recognition
probe itself and the perceptually disrupting prime of a string of symbols (@#$%&?*8). The
third type was a lexically disrupting prime, the word that is an orthographic neighbor of the
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recognition probe that has higher frequency than the probe word itself. Studies have shown
that the use of an orthographic neighbor as a masked prime can hinder the processing of
target stimulus (e.g., Segui & Granger, 1990). Use of two different types of disrupting primes
could increase the chance of discrepancy induction whether the disruption of processing
fluency in discrepancy induction is driven more by perceptual or lexical processes or both.
Another important advantage of using masked priming is that unlike unmasked
priming, masked priming is less likely to exhibit the frequency attenuation effect. The
frequency attenuation effect refers to differential facilitation of processing for high versus
low frequency words, such as a greater benefit of priming for low frequency words (e.g.,
Rarajam & Neely, 1984). With masked priming, both high and low frequency words could
show the effect of priming (although it is possible that the amount of facilitative priming is
greater for low frequency words than high frequency words, see, Kinoshita, 1995).
By using high and low frequency words and manipulating the processing difficulty of
those words via masked priming, I aimed to induce discrepancy by mismatching experienced
processing fluency from that of expected processing fluency in a manner that closely
resembled what Whittlesea and colleagues have done. In particular, Whittlesea and Williams
(1998) have argued that higher false alarm rates for orthographically regular nonwords,
compared to that of words or orthographically irregular nonwords, originate from the
surprisingly more fluent processing of those nonwords afforded by orthographic regularity.
They suggested that participants were not able to correctly attribute that surprisingly more
fluent processing to orthographic regularity. I reasoned that the processing fluency
differences of high and low frequency words and corresponding expectations would match
those of words and orthographically regular nonwords. Furthermore, masked priming of
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facilitation and disruption would allow the manipulation of processing fluency of high and
low frequency words without participants being aware of the source of the fluency variation.
This overlap between Experiment 2 of the current project to that of Whittlesea and Williams
led me to expect to find discrepancy effects on RM performance in Experiment 2.
Many studies have reported higher hit and lower false alarm rates for low frequency
words than for high frequency words, which is called the word frequency mirror effect on
recognition memory (e.g., Balota & Neely, 1980; Glanzer & Adams, 1985; Glanzer &
Bowles, 1976; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). The combination of the word frequency mirror effect
in recognition memory and the processing fluency manipulation via masked priming allows
competing predictions to be generated from the fluency attribution and the discrepancy
attribution accounts. According to the fluency attribution account, fluency modulated by
different types of primes could elevate the overall RM level and retain the word frequency
mirror effect. More specifically, the fluency attribution account would predict a main effect
of word frequency, showing the mirror effect described above on both hit and false alarm
rates. Further, it would predict a main effect of prime type, such that test probes paired with
the identity prime (producing more fluent processing) would have higher hit and false alarm
rates compared to test probes paired with the disrupting primes. Lastly, the fluency attribution
account would predict no significant interaction of word frequency and prime type on RM
performance in the absence of the frequency attenuation effect (see Figure 11 for the
predicted pattern of results).
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Figure 11. Predicted RM performance by the fluency attribution account in Experiment 2.
HR = Hit rate, FAR = False alarm rate.

In the presence of the frequency attenuation effect, the identity prime might not be
able to increase the processing fluency of high frequency words. If so, the identity prime
might not increase hit and false alarm rates of high frequency words. Additionally, the
81

disrupting primes might not be able to decrease the processing fluency of low frequency
words, thereby, not decreasing hit and false alarm rates of low frequency words. In such cases,
the differences on recognition performance among the different types of prime might
decrease for both high and low frequency words. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of
predicted results would not change (i.e., main effects of word frequency and prime type with
no interaction of word frequency by prime type).
However, according to the discrepancy attribution account, a significant interaction
of word frequency and prime type is predicted for both hit and false alarm rates. The
reasoning is that participants might find the facilitation in processing fluency of low
frequency words by the identity prime discrepant, because low frequency words are
processed more fluently than anticipated. This discrepancy could give rise to familiarity,
which would increase the hit and false alarm rates for low frequency words preceded by the
identity primes relative to those preceded by the disrupting primes. In comparison, the
disrupting primes could cause a discrepancy for high frequency words by violating the
expected level of processing fluency for them. This discrepancy could then increase hit and
false alarm rates of high frequency words preceded by disrupting primes relative to the high
frequency words preceded by the identity primes (see Figure 12 for the predicted pattern of
results). The presence or absence of the frequency attenuation effect, again, would not change
the overall pattern of results predicted by the discrepancy attribution account.
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Figure 12. Predicted RM performance by the discrepancy attribution account in Experiment 2.
HR = Hit rate, FAR = False alarm rate.

One well received explanation for the word frequency mirror effect on recognition
memory by dual process theorists (e.g., Guttentag & Carroll, 1994; Joordens & Hockley,
2000; Reder et al., 2000) claims that higher hit rates of low frequency words compared to
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high frequency words are driven by differences in recollection. Furthermore, that explanation
argues lower false alarm rates of low frequency words compared to high frequency words are
driven by differences in familiarity. In support of this, studies have found more “remember”
responses and fewer “know” responses to accompany hits of low frequency words compared
to those of high frequency words (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990; Joordens & Hockley, 2000;
Reder et al., 2000).
Both fluency and discrepancy are theorized to influence familiarity processes (e.g.,
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). Thus, if fluency were to influence RM
performance as formulated above (i.e., a main effect of word frequency and a main effect of
prime type on hits and false alarms without an interaction of word frequency by prime type),
proportions of “remember” and “know” responses for low and high frequency words would
replicate previous findings (e.g., more “remember” and fewer “know” responses to
accompany hits of low frequency words compared to hits of high frequency words).
Additionally, considering the possibility of fluency giving rise to familiarity, relatively more
“know” responses are expected to accompany increased hits and false alarms of both high
and low frequency words paired with the identity prime compared to those paired with the
disrupting primes. However, if discrepancy were to influence RM performance, then a higher
proportion of “know” responses should accompany hits and false alarms of low frequency
words with the identity primes than those with the disrupting primes. Furthermore, a higher
proportion of “know” responses should accompany hits and false alarms of high frequency
words with the disrupting primes than those with the identity primes.
It is important to note that familiarity processes are more pronounced when the
memory strength is weaker than when it is relatively stronger (e.g., Goldinger & Hansen,
84

2005). Thus, I aimed to have memory performance at a moderate level so that there was
enough range for familiarity to be increased either by fluency or discrepancy. Below, I first
present the pilot for Experiment 2 to show that the suggested manipulation is likely to be
successful. I then describe Experiment 2.
5.1 Pilot
Seven participants were tested in a 2 (Word frequency; High/Low) X 3 (Prime type;
Identity/Perceptually disrupting/Lexically disrupting) all within-participant design.
After consulting a number of articles on word frequency and recognition memory
paradigms that reported their stimuli (e.g., Balota, Burgess, Cortese, & Adams, 2002), I
constructed two sets of high and low frequency words, each set consisting of 48 low
frequency words and 48 high frequency words. Adjectives, nouns, and verbs ranging between
3 to 7 letters were used. Mean length of words was 4.52 and 4.77 for high frequency and low
frequency words, respectively. High frequency words had the mean Log Hal Frequency of
10.00 and low frequency words had the mean Log Hal Frequency of 7.08 (Balota et al., 2007).
For each of these 192 words, I constructed three types of primes: the identity, the
perceptually disrupting, and the lexically disrupting primes. The identity prime was the test
probe itself. The perceptually disrupting prime was a string of symbols randomly constructed
with @#$%&?*8 (e.g., “#$%&@” was used as the perceptually disrupting prime for the
stimulus of “mayor”). The lexically disrupting prime was a word that was an orthographic
neighbor of the test probe that had higher word frequency than the test probe itself (e.g.,
“major” was used as the lexically disrupting prime for the stimulus of “mayor”). Words used
as the lexically disrupting prime for high frequency words had the mean Log Hal frequency
of 11.42 and those used for low frequency words had the mean Log Hal frequency of 9.54.
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One set of stimuli was used for word trials of the LDT. From the other set, 24 high frequency
words and 24 low frequency words were selected and converted to nonwords that were
pronounceable. The use of each set for word trials and the use of each prime type for each
word were counterbalanced.
Participants were provided with instructions on how to perform the LDT. Then, they
performed a block of practice trials with feedback on response accuracy and speed. Prior to
the presentation of each LDT trial, a forward pattern mask of +*+*+*+* (“forward mask”)
was presented for 250 msec. This was followed by three presentations of an appropriate
single prime for 15 msec each, alternated with two presentations of 15 msec-long midmask of
@*#*$*@*. Total presentation time for the primes was 45 msec and the last prime was
followed by the forward mask for 250 msec. The experimental block consisted of 96 words
and 48 nonwords that were pseudo-randomly presented. No participant commented on the
blinking of the screen during the post-experimental survey (see Figure 13 for an example
stimulus presentation).
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Figure 13. An example of stimulus presentation in Experiment 2. Dashed boxes indicate the
common component of the stimulus presentation.

Mean trimmed LDT RTs of word trials were entered into a 2 (Word frequency:
High/Low) X 3 (Prime type: Identity/Perceptually disrupting/Lexically disrupting) repeated
measures ANOVA with all factors as within-participant variables (See Table 8 for descriptive
statistics). There was a main effect of word frequency, F (1, 6) = 13.10, MSE = 1560.80, p
= .011, ηp2 = .69, such that LDT RTs were faster for high frequency words (M = 533 msec)
than for low frequency words (M = 577 msec). There was a main effect of prime type, F (2,
12) = 8.31, MSE = 707.86, p = .005, ηp2 = .581. Planned comparisons indicated that the
identity prime led to faster LDT RTs (M = 531 msec) than either the lexically disrupting
prime (M = 566 msec) or the perceptually disrupting prime (M = 568 msec), Fs (1, 12) >
5.23, MSE = 819.52, ps < .042. The interaction of word frequency by prime type was not
significant, F < 1.
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Table 8.
Mean RTs of correct LDT trials as a function of word frequency, prime type, and lexicality in
the Pilot
Prime Type

Identity

Lexical

Perceptual

Word
High Frequency

506 (55)

548 (54)

544 (87)

Low Frequency

556 (83)

583 (78)

591 (76)

Nonword
High Frequency

657 (75)

654 (75)

674 (113)

Low Frequency

644 (72)

665 (94)

657 (110)

Note. “Lexical” refers to the lexically disrupting prime type and “Perceptual” refers to the
perceptually disrupting prime type. RTs are in msec. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Mean LDT accuracy of words trials was entered into a 2 (Word frequency:
High/Low) X 3 (Prime type: Identity/Perceptually disrupting/Lexically disrupting) repeated
measures ANOVA with all factors as within-participant variables (see Table 9 for descriptive
statistics). The main effect of word frequency was marginally significant, F (1, 6) = 4.88,
MSE = .003, p = .069, ηp2 = .448, such that LDT accuracy was marginally higher for high
frequency words (M = .98) than for low frequency words (M = .94). No other main effect or
interaction of word frequency by prime type was significant, Fs < 1.75.
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Table 9.
Mean accuracy of LDT responses as a function of word frequency, prime type, and lexicality
in the Pilot
Prime Type

Identity

Lexical

Perceptual

High Frequency

.98 (.02)

.98 (.03)

.97 (.05)

Low Frequency

.95 (.04)

.95 (.03)

.92 (.03)

High Frequency

.91 (.09)

.84 (.17)

.84 (.19)

Low Frequency

.89 (.15)

.89 (.18)

.91 (.16)

Word

Nonword

Note. “Lexical” refers to the lexically disrupting prime type and “Perceptual” refers to the
perceptually disrupting prime type. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

For the nonword trials of the LDT, there was no main effect of word frequency or
prime type or interaction of word frequency by prime type on either mean RTs or accuracy of
LDT, Fs < 2.08
The results of this pilot are consistent with the previous literature showing easier
processing of high frequency words than low frequency words (e.g., Rajaram & Neely, 1992).
Thus, these results suggest that experimentally valid high and low frequency words were
selected. Furthermore, faster RTs of words preceded by the identity prime compared to RTs
of words preceded by the lexically disrupting and perceptually disrupting primes suggest that
the proposed priming manipulation of processing fluency was effective.
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Participants and design. The experiment was a 2 (Word frequency; High/Low)
X 3 (Prime type; Identity/Perceptually disrupting/Lexically disrupting) X 2 (Study status;
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Studied/Nonstudied) all within-participant design. Fifty-three participants were tested.
5.2.2 Materials. Materials were the same as in the Pilot, with one exception. One set
of 48 high frequency words and 48 low frequency words were used as study materials. The
other set of 48 high frequency words and 48 low frequency words was used as nonstudied
distracters during the test. Each set was equally used as study materials and distracters across
participants.
5.2.3 Procedure. Participants first received the instruction for the recognition test and
performed a block of practice trials. Then, for the experimental block, participants studied a
list of 48 high frequency words and 48 low frequency words. Study words were presented in
random order for each participant and each word was presented for two seconds. Upon the
completion of the study phase, participants were asked to solve a list of math problems for 15
seconds as a distractor task.
After the study phase and the distractor task, participants were tested with all 96
studied words and 96 nonstudied words with matching characteristics. The test was pseudorandomly ordered such that no more than four consecutive trials were of the same word
frequency or prime type or study status. The recognition probe was presented in black font on
a white background without any symbols covering over it (unlike Experiments 1a and 1b).
Prior to the presentation of each recognition probe, a forward pattern mask of +*+*+*+*
(“forward mask”) were presented for 250 msec. This was followed by three presentations of
an appropriate prime for 15 msec each, alternated with two presentations of 15 msec-long
midmask of @*#*$*@*. Total presentation time for prime was 45 msec and the last prime
was followed by the forward mask for 250 msec.
While performing the recognition test, participants were asked to make a
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remember/know response for the recognition probe they judged to be “old”. Explanations
(adapted from Rajaram, 1993) were provided for when a remember response and when a
know response was appropriate. At the end of the test block, participants were surveyed with
a series of questions regarding the detection of discrepancy and its attribution.
5.2.4 Data analysis. Data from the participants who commented on the blinking of
the screen and/or detection of prime during the post-experimental survey were excluded from
the analysis. Of the 53 participants that were tested, 11 participants were excluded.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Recognition memory performance. The hit and false alarm rates were
calculated separately for trials for each word frequency (High/Low) and for each prime type
(Identity/Perceptually disrupting/Lexically disrupting) (See Table 10 for descriptive statistics).
Table 10.
Mean proportion of “Old” responses on recognition trials as a function of word frequency,
prime type, and study status in Experiment 2
Prime Type

Identity

Lexical

Perceptual

High Frequency

.52 (.21)

.51 (.22)

.56 (.22)

Low Frequency

.62 (.19)

.62 (.23)

.62 (.21)

High Frequency

.16 (.15)

.14 (.16)

.16 (.15)

Low Frequency

.15 (.14)

.13 (.14)

.14 (.13)

Hit

False Alarm

Note. “Lexical” refers to the lexically disrupting prime type and “Perceptual” refers to the
perceptually disrupting prime type. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Hit rate. Proportion of correct “old” responses to previously studied items was
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entered into a 2 (Word frequency: High/Low) x 3 (Priming type: Identity/Perceptually
disrupting/Lexically disrupting) mixed ANOVA with all factors as within-participant
variables (see Figure 14). There was a main effect of word frequency, F (1, 41) = 38.43, MSE
= .013, p = .031, ηp2 = .06, such that low frequency words were better correctly recognized
(.65) than high frequency words (M = .55). The main effect of priming type or interaction of
word frequency by prime type were not significant, Fs < 1.5. A Bayesian analysis showed
strong support for no interaction, PBIC (H0|D) = .95.

Figure 14. Actual RM performance in Experiment 2. HR = Hit rate. Error bars denote
standard errors.
False alarm rate. Proportion of incorrect “old” responses to nonstudied items was
entered into a 2 (Word frequency: High/Low) x 3 (Priming type: Identity/Perceptually
disrupting/Lexically disrupting) mixed ANOVA with all factors as within-participant
variables. There was no significant main effect or interaction, Fs < 1.6. A Bayesian analysis
showed strong support for no interaction, PBIC (H0|D) = .98.
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Remember/Know responses. Immediately after making the recognition memory
judgment for each test word, participants were asked to make a “remember” or “know”
response for the words they responded as having previously studied. Given the low level of
false alarm rates and many participants not having a value for all possible cells, I will only
report the proportion of “remember” and “know” responses for hits. Also, two participants
did not have any hit for one of six cells. Thus, they were excluded from the analysis of
remember/know responses and analysis of RTs of correct recognition judgments
Proportion of “remember” responses for “old” responses to previously studied items
was entered into a 2 (Word frequency: High/Low) x 3 (Priming type: Identity/Perceptually
disrupting/Lexically disrupting) mixed ANOVA with all factors as within-participant
variables (See Table 11 for descriptive statistics). There was a main effect of word frequency,
F (1, 39) = 7.31, MSE = .04, p = .01, ηp2 = .16, such that the hits of low frequency words had
a higher proportion of “remember” responses (M = .59) than the hits of high frequency words
(M = .52). The main effect of prime type or interaction of word frequency by prime type was
not significant, Fs < 1. Analysis of “know” response showed the reverse pattern such that
there were more “know” responses for the high frequency words than that for the low
frequency words.

93

Table 11.
Mean proportion of ‘Remember’ versus ‘Know’ responses to studied items correctly
recognized during the recognition test as a function of word frequency and prime type in
Experiment 2
Prime Type

Identity

Lexical

Perceptual

High Frequency

.52 (.22)

.52 (.22)

.54 (.24)

Low Frequency

.59 (.24)

.59 (.24)

.61 (.26)

High Frequency

.48 (.22)

.48 (.22)

.46 (.24)

Low Frequency

.41 (.24)

.41 (.24)

.39 (.26)

Remember

Know

Note. “Conceptual” refers to the lexically disrupting prime type and “Perceptual” refers to the
perceptually disrupting prime type. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

RTs of correct recognition judgments. Mean trimmed RTs of hit responses were
entered into a 2 (Word Frequency: High/Low) X 3 (Prime type: Identity/Perceptually
disrupting/Lexically disrupting) mixed ANOVA with all factors as within-participant
variables (see Table 12 for descriptive statistics). There was a main effect of word frequency,
F (1, 39) = 14.56, MSE = 28484.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .27, such that hit responses for high
frequency words were slower (M = 1191 msec) than for low frequency words (M = 1107
msec). There was a main effect of prime type, F (2, 78) = 3.54, MSE = 17995.80, p = .034,
ηp2 = .083, such that hit responses for words preceded by the identity prime were marginally
faster (M = 1117 msec) than hit responses for words preceded by the lexically disrupting
prime (M = 1172 msec), F (1, 78) = 3.39, MSE = 17839.71, p < .07, but not compared to hit
responses for words preceded by the perceptually disrupting prime (M = 1158 msec). The
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interaction of word frequency by prime type was not significant, F < 1.
Table 12.
Mean RTs of correct responses on recognition trials as a function of word frequency, prime
type, and study status in Experiment 2
Prime Type
Identity
Lexical
Perceptual
Hit
High Frequency
1154 (313)
1215 (303)
1203 (238)
Low Frequency
1080 (234)
1128 (215)
1114 (247)
Correct Rejection
High Frequency
1035 (276)
1044 (263)
1040 (289)
Low Frequency

979 (225)

980 (209)

1022 (251)

Note. “Lexical” refers to the lexically disrupting prime type and “Perceptual” refers to the
perceptually disrupting prime type. RTs are in msec. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Mean trimmed RTs of correct rejection responses were entered into a 2 (Word
Frequency: High/Low) X 3 (Prime type: Identity/Perceptually disrupting/Conceptually
disrupting) mixed ANOVA with all factors as within-participant variables. There was a main
effect of word frequency, F (1, 41) = 7.85, MSE = 17032.95, p = .008, ηp2 = .16, such that
correct rejections of high frequency words were slower (M = 1040 msec) than that of low
frequency words (M = 994 msec). Main effect of prime type or the interaction of word
frequency by prime type was not significant, Fs < 1.61.
5.4 Discussion
Using the materials and manipulation that showed different levels of processing
fluency in the pilot, I found higher hit rates for low frequency words relative to that for high
frequency words. I also found more “remember” and fewer “know” responses to accompany
correctly remembered, previously studied low frequency words compared to that of high
frequency words. Both of these findings are consistent with the existing literature that showed
the hit advantage of low frequency words accompanied by more “remember” and fewer
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“know” responses (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990; Reder et al., 2000). Also replicating the
existing literature are the faster RTs for hits of low frequency words than of high frequency
words (e.g., Duchek & Neely, 1989). Despite replicating standard findings in the literature, I
was not able to find discrepancy effects on RM. Below, I discuss the implications of these
findings.
The pilot study verified that the priming manipulation produced an influence on the
fluency of both low and high frequency words during an LDT: LDT RTs were faster for
words with the identity prime than words with the perceptually and the lexically disrupting
primes. Nevertheless, although there was a main effect of prime type on the RTs of hit
responses, there was no main effect or any interaction of prime type on the mean accuracy of
RM performance in Experiment 2. The possibility of no facilitative priming on high
frequency words cannot easily account for this pattern of data. The present experiment was
set up such that even if the identity prime does not enhance the processing fluency of high
frequency words, the disrupting primes could reduce the processing fluency of high
frequency words, to maximize the chance to observe a priming effect. The reasoning was
similar for low frequency words such that even if the disrupting primes do not reduce the
processing fluency of low frequency words, the identity prime could enhance the processing
fluency of low frequency words. Even with such design features, however, there was no
effect of priming on the accuracy of recognition judgments.
Given that Rajaram and Neely (1992) have reported that their use of masked priming
of 50 msec increased hit and false alarm rates of both high and low frequency words in an
intentional learning task, it is puzzling that hit and false alarm rates of low and high
frequency words did not differ as a function of prime type in the present experiment. Given
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the possibility of the priming manipulation interacting with stimulus strength (e.g., Rajaram
& Neely), which can be mapped to the study status of items, it is possible to predict a less
strong effect of priming on studied words than nonstudied words and not find an effect of
prime type on hit rates in Experiment 2. Even if this was the case, however, it would not
interfere with finding an effect of prime type in the false alarm rates, which was absent in
Experiment 2. Perhaps, a total of 45 msec of three 15-msec-long prime presentations (with
two 15-msec-long midmask presentations interleaved in between) might not have been
sufficient to show its effect on RM, although it successfully varied the fluency of responding
in the LDT in the pilot study.
Even though the effect of multiple prime presentations of 15 msec in Experiment 2
might differ from the effect of a single prime presentation of 45 msec reported by Rajaram
and Neely (1992), the lack of a priming effect on RM does not seem to be a sufficient
explanation for the lack of the discrepancy effect on RM in Experiment 2. The main effect of
priming type shown in the pilot, relative differences in processing fluency reflected in
differential RTs of LDT, seems to closely resemble what Whittlesea and colleagues have
presented as an explanation for higher false alarm rates for discrepant items. For example,
Whittlesea and Williams (2001a) also found differential RTs in pronunciation of discrepant
and nondiscrepant items. So, the lack of a priming effect on RM performance in Experiment
2 appears to be an insufficient explanation for the lack of discrepancy effect in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 was conducted to explore one possibility for why a discrepancy effect
was not found in Experiment 1a. One explanation for not finding the discrepancy effect on
RM in Experiment 1a is the possible incompatibility of the expectations violated in
Experiment 1a compared to most expectations used by Whittlesea and colleagues. The
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reasoning was that the expectation for processing fluency developed during the experiment
by processing a list of easy or difficult items was not potent enough for its violation to cause
discrepancy in Experiment 1a. On the other hand, the expectations Whittlesea and colleagues
violated were built pre-experimentally over an extended period of one’s life, such as
expectations for how words and nonwords should be processed (1998) or how many words
can sensibly fit in a particular sentence (2001b). To address this possible incompatibility,
Experiment 2 attempted to induce discrepancy by violating the pre-experimental expectations
for processing fluency of low and high frequency words with the use of different primes.
Nevertheless, even with the manipulations that could violate the pre-experimental
expectations (as confirmed by the RT pattern on the LDT in the pilot), there was no effect of
discrepancy on RM in Experiment 2. Perhaps, participants develop multiple expectations in
processing items for a recognition task. Some studies have found that participants expect that
high frequency words will be better remembered than low frequency words on a subsequent
recognition test when asked to judge the memorability of items at study although this pattern
reverses when the judgment was made at test (Benjamin, 2003; Guttentag & Carroll, 1998).
Furthermore, McCabe and Balota (2007) reported that experience with high or low frequency
words at study or test alone can influence the placement of decision criterion for a
recognition judgment for medium frequency words. Their report suggests that people can
adjust expectations for memorability of the same items in comparison to other items.
However, prior experience of a recognition task alone does not lead to the reversed
pattern of memorability judgments for high and low frequency words, but instead leads to
comparable levels of memorability judgments for high and low frequency words (Experiment
2 of Benjamin, 2003). Thus, even if the expectation of memorability of recognition probes
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was to play a role in Experiment 2, the combination of expectations for processing fluency
and memorability of high and low frequency words should have been consistent with
expectations for processing fluency alone. Unfortunately, it is unclear what the discrepancy
attribution account would predict when multiple expectations might contradict one another
and which expectation would take priority. Given this uncertainty of predictions from the
discrepancy attribution account, it seems most parsimonious to conclude that, together with
the null effect of discrepancy on RM in Experiment 1a, the results of Experiment 2
corroborate the claims that suggest discrepancy might not be as a general phenomenon as
Whittlesea and colleagues have proposed (Cleary et al., 2007; Karpicke et al., 2008).
Although I found an advantage of low frequency words in hit rates accompanied by
more “remember” responses, there was no effect of word frequency on false alarm rates,
which seems surprising at first glance. Although most papers on word frequency and
recognition memory report the usual word frequency mirror effect (higher hit and lower false
alarm rates of low frequency words), several papers showed deviations from this pattern.
Those papers manipulated factors that are known to differentially influence recollection and
familiarity processes, such as speeded response deadline (e.g., Experiment 2 in Balota et al.,
2002; Bridger, Bader, & Mecklinger, 2014), which eliminates the hit advantage but retains
the false alarm advantage of low frequency words.
However, a closer inspection of the existing literature shows that a number of studies
report no false alarm advantage for low frequency (relative to high-frequency) words in the
presence of a hit advantage for low frequency words (Experiments 1 and 2, Coane, Balota,
Dolan, & Jacoby, 2011; Experiment 1, Gardiner & Java, 1990; Experiment 1, Rajaram &
Neely, 1992; Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2 of Pazzaglia, Staub, & Rotello, 2014). Both Rajaram
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and Neely and Pazzaglia et al. attributed their failure to find the false alarm advantage of low
frequency words to methodological variations of their studies compared to other studies that
have reported both hit and false alarm advantage of low frequency words. In light of the same
pattern of data from Experiment 2, it is unlikely, however, that the lack of a false alarm
advantage for low frequency words is due to random methodological variations in these
studies. Perhaps, this pattern suggests a boundary condition of the word frequency mirror
effect that can be further investigated.
Experiment 2 found that RTs of hit responses for the recognition probes preceded by
the identity primes were faster than those preceded by the lexically disrupting primes.
Although this pattern seems to suggest a successful priming manipulation, it is difficult to
interpret its implication. Faster RTs of recognition judgments could be interpreted as
indicative of stronger memory strength for recognition probes (e.g., Jou et al., 2004). Perhaps,
the enhanced processing fluency of recognition probes by the identity prime were interpreted
as representing stronger memory strength and led to faster RTs of recognition judgments. If
this was the case, this would support the fluency attribution account which suggests that the
fluent processing of recognition probes can increase the familiarity judgments for those items.
However, the faster RTs of hit responses for the recognition probes preceded by the identity
primes were not accompanied by higher hit responses. Also, because the RTs of recognition
judgments measured the time it took participants both to perceive a recognition probe and to
make a recognition judgment, it is difficult to distinguish whether the priming effect on the
RTs of recognition judgments reflects the priming effect on the perceptual processes or on the
recognition processes or both in Experiment 2.
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Chapter 6: General Discussion
Some researchers have claimed that discrepancy could be attributed as familiarity
and influence recognition memory (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b) and
false memory (Whittlesea, 2002; Whittlesea et al., 2005). Other researchers have extended
this claim and proposed that discrepancy could be attributed as significance and influence PM
(Lee & McDaniel, 2013; Thomas & McBride, 2015). However, other studies have found
evidence against discrepancy influencing recognition memory (Cleary et al., 2007) or false
memory (Karpicke et al., 2008). Based on these opposing claims and data, the current project
investigated the generality of the discrepancy effect on RM and PM using paradigms that
manipulated actual processing fluency and expected processing fluency, either developed
during (Experiments 1a and 1b) or prior to (Experiment 2) the experimental session. Despite
the success with the processing fluency manipulations, as indicated by faster RTs and higher
accuracy in a LDT on the easy items compared to the difficult items, I did not observe an
effect of discrepancy either on RM (Experiments 1a and 2) or PM (Experiment 1b).
Instead, I found higher hit rates for easy items relative to difficult items in
Experiment 1a, providing support for the fluency attribution account. I also found higher hit
rates for low frequency words relative to high frequency words, accompanied by more
“remember” and fewer “know” responses (Experiment 2), replicating previous findings in the
literature. Even though findings from Experiments 1a and 2 converged with various findings
in the literature (e.g., higher hit rates for easy items, Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; for low
frequency words with more remember responses, Joordens & Hockley, 2000), findings from
the three current experiments did not provide any support for the discrepancy attribution
account of either RM or PM.
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One possibility for not finding the effect of discrepancy in Experiments 1a and 1b
was because the expectation of processing fluency built during the experimental session
might have been not strong enough for its violation to elicit discrepancy. However,
Experiment 2 used high and low frequency words as stimuli. Based on previous findings that
showed people judge high frequency words as easier to process (e.g., Begg et al., 1989), and
objective measures confirming that judgment (e.g., faster RTs and higher accuracy of LDT
for high frequency words compared to low frequency words, e.g., Stanners, Jastrzembski, &
Westbrook, 1975), I reasoned that participants would have had pre-experimental expectations
for processing fluency of high and low frequency items, just as Whittlesea and colleague’s
participants presumably did for words and nonwords or for other stimuli (1998, 2000, 2001a,
2001b). Experiment 2 still found no effect of discrepancy.
Perhaps, the processing fluency manipulation used in Experiments 1a and 1b did not
elicit discrepancy because that paradigm did not closely match the paradigms Whittlesea and
Williams used (e.g., 1998, 2001b). Considering that the processing fluency manipulation used
in Experiment 2 more closely matched the paradigms Whittlesea and colleagues used,
perhaps discrepancy was elicited in Experiment 2 but did not influence RM. Unfortunately, in
all three experiments of the current project and existing experiments that tested the
discrepancy attribution account in the literature, discrepancy is not directly assessed but
indirectly inferred by its influence on other measures, such as RM or PM performance. Thus,
the current formulation of the discrepancy attribution account (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998;
2000; 2001a, 2001b) cannot distinguish whether the lack of discrepancy effects on RM and/or
PM is due to the failure to elicit discrepancy or the failure for discrepancy to be attributed to
something, such as familiarity or significance of discrepant items.
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Another possibility for not finding the discrepancy effect is that the power could
have been insufficient to detect effects in the current project. Taking the relevant experiments
reported in the most cited papers of Whittlesea’s work, the discrepancy effect seems to be a
medium to large size, ranging between Cohen’s d of .52 to 2 (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998,
2000, 2001a, 2001b). Cleary et al. (2007) who replicated the discrepancy effect using
materials and paradigms from Whittlesea and Williams (1998) reported the effect size of
discrepancy in their findings to range between .55 and .65. Based on the findings from Lee
and McDaniel (2013) and Thomas and McBride (2015), the effect size of discrepancy in PM
seems to range between .53 and .58.
A power analysis was conducted using the smallest Cohen’s d of .5 from the
abovementioned values as an estimated effect size, using G*Power software (Erdfelder, Faul,
& Buchner, 1996). Power to detect a medium sized effect (Cohen’s d of .5; Cohen, 1988) was
estimated to be greater than .99 for both Experiments 1a and 2 and .60 for Experiment 1b.
Power to detect a large sized effect (Cohen’s d of .8) was estimated to be greater than .99 for
all three experiments in the current project. The result of the power analysis suggests that if
my processing fluency paradigm induced discrepancy, there would have been sufficient
power to detect a discrepancy effect in Experiments 1a and 2. In addition to the power
analysis, the Bayesian analyses reported throughout all three experiments of the current
project (except for the hit rates of critical items in Experiment 1a) provided positive support
for the null hypothesis, PBICs (H0|D) > .90. Thus, Bayesian analyses also suggest that
discrepant items did not differ from nondiscrepant items in RM and PM in the current project.
Given the success with manipulating processing fluency with the paradigms in the
current project and the results of the power analysis and Bayesian analysis of Experiments 1a
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and 2, the lack of a discrepancy effect in my paradigm lends more evidence for the claims
that discrepancy and its influence on memory might be more limited than Whittlesea and
colleagues have suggested (Cleary et al., 2007; Karpicke et al., 2008). Instead, the significant
effect of fluency on hit rates of easy items in Experiment 1a provided additional supporting
evidence to the fluency attribution account (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby &
Whitehouse, 1989). The fluency attribution account suggests that fluency can be attributed as
familiarity. Faster RTs and higher accuracy of LDT of easy items, compared to difficult items,
reflect such fluency. Therefore, higher hit rates of easy items compared to that of difficult
items in Experiment 1a are consistent with the prediction posed by the fluency attribution
account. It is worth noting, however, that the higher hit rates of low frequency words
compared to high frequency words in Experiment 2, when low frequency words had slower
RTs and lower accuracy of LDT than high frequency words, are inconsistent with the fluency
attribution account as well as the discrepancy attribution account.
Considering that discrepancy is elicited by the mismatch between the expected
processing quality and the actual processing quality, the discrepancy attribution account also
can theoretically account for higher familiarity for more fluently processed items as long as
that fluency somehow creates a mismatch with processing expectations. The critical
distinction between the two accounts is that the discrepancy attribution account makes a
unique prediction that even less fluently processed items can receive higher familiarity than
more fluently processed items as long as less fluently processed items stimulate discrepancy
elicited by the mismatch between the expected processing quality and the actual processing
quality of those items.
Although Whittlesea and colleagues have provided evidence of less fluently
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processed items receiving higher familiarity judgments than more fluently processed items
(e.g. Whittlesea & Williams, 1998), it is noteworthy to point out that not all of the data
supporting the discrepancy attribution account show higher familiarity judgments for less
fluently processed items. Some findings showed discrepancy on relatively more fluent items,
for which the fluency attribution account could also provide a plausible interpretation. For
example, Hansen et al. (2008) interpreted higher ratings of subjective truth of fluent
sentences preceded by less fluent sentences with discrepancy being attributed as subjective
truth of those sentences. However, the same pattern of result can be explained by fluency
attributed as subjective truth of “discrepant” sentences. Considering the difficulty to observe
a discrepancy effect across memory paradigms and the potential for an overlap of predictions
postulated by the fluency attribution account and the discrepancy attribution account, more
caution is needed with using the discrepancy attribution account over the fluency attribution
account in interpreting experimental data.
6.1 Implications of Experiment 1b for Discrepancy Effects in PM
Unfortunately, the power analysis found that power was insufficient to detect a
medium-sized effect in Experiment 1b. However, the Bayesian analysis provided positive
support for the null hypothesis that PM performance for the discrepant PM cues did not differ
from that for the nondiscrepant PM cues. Thus, the opposing results of the power analysis
and the Bayesian analysis limit the interpretation of the lack of discrepancy on PM
performance. A more pertinent factor that may limit the interpretation is the use of nonfocal
PM cues. According to the multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000, 2007),
nonfocal PM is supported by strategic monitoring processes that demands limited attentional
resources. Experiment 1b used nonfocal PM cues with the premises that (1) the limited
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attentional resources could make sustaining monitoring throughout the PM task challenging
and (2) discrepancy could assist the noticing of nonfocal PM cues that were missed by
monitoring. The relatively low PM performance in the nondiscrepant conditions in
Experiment 1b confirmed the first premise. The lack of the interaction of PM cue difficulty
by nontarget difficulty and the result of Bayesian analysis favoring no effect of discrepancy
on PM performance unfortunately cannot confirm or disconfirm the second premise. Perhaps,
discrepancy was not elicited and thus could not influence nonfocal PM performance or
discrepancy was elicited but did not influence nonfocal PM performance. The current project
cannot distinguish between these two possibilities.
Given that the finding from Experiment 1b is inconclusive, it is premature to argue
that the findings indicating that discrepancy can enhance focal PM (Lee & McDaniel, 2013;
Thomas & McBride, 2015) should be discounted because of the lack of discrepancy effect on
nonfocal PM in Experiment 1b. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether the failure to
find effects of discrepancy in RM (in Experiments 1a and 2) undercut the discrepancy-based
interpretations for previous reports of enhanced focal PM performance. The generality of the
discrepancy effect in RM could be limited as suggested by findings from Experiments 1a and
2. Nonetheless, as suggested previously, the utility of discrepancy on PM performance might
be greater than on RM performance because of the lack of explicit prompt for retrieval in PM
tasks. If so, the lack of discrepancy effects in RM do not determine if an effect of discrepancy
should be observed in PM, regardless of whether the cue is focal or nonfocal. However, if
discrepancy does not assist the noticing of nonfocal PM cues and focal PM cues, an
alternative explanation is needed for previous reports of enhanced focal PM performance,
such as Lee and McDaniel and Thomas and McBride.
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One possible alternative is that relatively longer processing time of discrepant PM
cues, due to their relative disfluency compared to the nondiscrepant PM cues, in both Lee and
McDaniel (2013) and Thomas and McBride (2015) might have enhanced focal PM
performance via allowing more time for noticing of PM cues. Indeed, Lee and McDaniel
found significantly higher PM performance for PM cues that were the difficult anagrams
embedded among easy anagrams than PM cues that were difficult anagrams embedded
among difficult anagrams. Based on the RT data, difficult anagrams took longer to process
than easy anagrams. PM performance for PM cues that were the easy anagrams embedded
among difficult anagrams was only nominally higher than that for PM cues that were the easy
anagrams embedded among easy anagrams. Discrepant PM cues in Thomas and McBride
were also processed more slowly than nondiscrepant PM cues. Although all participants
performed the same ongoing task of a category decision task and received the same PM cues
of “arm” and “leg”, the category type for the majority of exemplars presented for the category
decision differed between the discrepant and the nondiscrepant conditions. The majority of
exemplars were from the “fruit” category in the discrepant condition whereas the majority of
exemplars were from the “body part” category in the nondiscrepant condition. Based on
Thomas and McBride’s finding that showed the slower RTs of a category decision task for
exemplars from the non-majority categories than from the majority category, discrepant PM
cues that were exemplars from the non-majority category would have been processed slower,
thus, allowing more time for noticing of PM cues, than nondiscrepant PM cues that were
exemplars from the majority category.
However, such an alternative explanation that the longer processing time for
discrepant PM cues was related to improved PM (rather than discrepancy attribution per se)
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does not apply to all findings that claimed to show discrepancy-enhanced PM performance.
For example, McDaniel et al. (Experiment 1, 2004) either pre-exposed or did not pre-expose
nontargets to elicit discrepancy while focal PM cues were pre-exposed in all conditions. They
claimed that discrepancy for the pre-exposed PM cues would be greater when nontargets are
not pre-exposed than when nontargets are pre-exposed. In support of their claim, they found
higher PM performance for the PM cues among nontargets that were not pre-exposed relative
to the PM cues among nontargets that were pre-exposed. Higher PM performance in this
finding cannot be explained by the longer processing time of discrepant PM cues. Therefore,
it is premature to discount the existing findings of discrepancy-enhanced focal PM
performance based on the lack of discrepancy effect in Experiment 1b.
Although power to detect a medium-sized effect might have been insufficient in
Experiment 1b, future research on nonfocal PM with greater power alone is insufficient to
address the issues discussed here. Rather, future research that compares the effect of
discrepancy for both focal and nonfocal PM cues can provide more insight on whether or not
discrepancy can influence both focal and nonfocal PM. Furthermore, considering the
theoretical utility of significance (attributed from discrepancy) in the successful noticing of
the PM cue, perhaps discrepancy-driven significance might play a more critical role in a
condition that makes the noticing of the nonfocal PM cue challenging. Presenting the first
PM cue long after participants received the PM instruction and performed trials of an ongoing
task could be such a condition. Scullin et al., (Experiment 4, 2010) reported that when the
first PM cue was presented after 500 trials of nontargets, participants were less likely to
sustain monitoring processes and only 7 out of 40 participants performed the nonfocal PM
task. Such conditions that discourage the engagement in monitoring processes could increase
108

the utility of significance attributed from discrepancy on PM performance.
6.2 Limitations of the Current Project
In addition to the lack of the discrepancy effect on RM and PM, there were additional
findings from the current project that are inconsistent with the literature. False alarm rates did
not differ between the easy and the difficult items in Experiment 1a or between low and high
frequency words in Experiment 2. Also, some patterns of RT results in Experiment 1a and
Experiment 2 were puzzling. The RTs of correct recognition judgments on both critical and
noncritical items were slower in the conditions with the easy list than in the conditions with
the difficult list. There was a main effect of prime type on the RTs of hit responses with no
main effect of prime type on the mean accuracy of hit responses in Experiment 2. Below, I
discuss the implications of these findings.
Experiment 1a showed comparable false alarm rates between easy and difficult items.
According to the fluency attribution account (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Whitehouse,
1989), the false alarm rate of easy items should be higher than that of difficult items.
Experiment 2 did not show the false alarm advantage of low frequency words. Within the
current project, it is possible that easy items and high frequency words did not have as many
false alarms as easy items and high frequency words did in experiments reported in the
existing literature. It is also possible that difficult items and low frequency words had more
false alarms than usual. Unfortunately, the current project cannot distinguish which of the
two possibilities led to no difference in false alarm rates between the two types of stimuli. .
However, Coane et al. (2011) explained that the high attentional demand of their
paradigm of speeded recognition could have decreased the false alarm advantage of low
frequency words in their Experiment 1. They reasoned that speeded recognition could have
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led their participants to rely more on relative familiarity (that tracks the increase of
familiarity from absolute/baseline familiarity) and not on absolute familiarity and that high
and low frequency did not differ in relative familiarity without a previous study episode. This
explanation could account for the lack of a word frequency effect on false alarm rates in
Experiment 2 of the current project. Perhaps, a memory test asking for a recognition
judgment with a remember/know response as in Experiment 2 or a memory test with a
perceptual mask as in Experiment 1a might have been challenging for participants compared
to a typical memory test asking for a recognition judgment alone with no perceptual mask.
Experiment 1a showed that the RTs of recognition judgments on both critical and
noncritical items in the conditions with the difficult list were faster than the RTs in the
conditions with the easy list. There are several possible explanations why such patterns of
RTs were observed. Unfortunately, none of those explanations are conclusive. Experiment 2
found faster RTs of hit responses for the recognition probes preceded by the identity primes
than by the lexically disrupting primes. Although the faster RTs of hit responses with the
identity primes in Experiment 2 were suggestive of the fluency attribution on familiarity
judgments, without the higher mean accuracy to match the faster RTs, the implication of the
faster RTs was also unclear. One overarching limitation in interpreting the above mentioned
RT data stems from the failure to properly partition an RT to the perceptual processes and the
recognition processes although Experiment 1a attempted such partitioning by measuring RTs
separately for the LDT and the recognition judgment. Future research might consider using
more precise measures of RT associated with each of those processes.
6.3 Conclusion
The current project attempted to investigate the generality of the discrepancy effect
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in RM and PM. Experiment 1a manipulated the processing fluency (easy versus difficult)
using the perceptual mask and masked priming. The actual processing fluency was matched
or mismatched to the expected processing fluency developed during the experimental session
to elicit discrepancy. Although the faster RTs and higher accuracy of LDT of the easy items
compared to the difficult items suggested that the processing fluency manipulation was
successful, there was no discrepancy effect on recognition memory of items whose expected
processing fluency mismatched the actual processing fluency. Instead, in Experiment 1a,
higher hit rates of easy items were observed, compared to the difficult items, providing
support for the fluency attribution account. Experiment 1b used the same paradigm as
Experiment 1a and incorporated a nonfocal PM task to test the discrepancy effect on PM.
Despite the possibility that the utility of discrepancy in PM tasks can be greater than in RM
tasks, PM performance did not differ across discrepant and nondiscrepant conditions.
Given that the violation of the expected processing fluency developed during the
experiment might be insufficient to elicit discrepancy, Experiment 2 attempted to elicit
discrepancy by violating the expected processing fluency developed pre-experimentally with
high and low frequency words and masked priming. Although the result of the pilot
suggested that the priming manipulation was successful, there was no effect of priming or
discrepancy on the mean accuracy of recognition judgments. Although I was able to replicate
both the hit advantage of low frequency words relative to high frequency words and more
“remember” and fewer “know” responses for low frequency words than high frequency
words, I did not observe the false alarm advantage of low frequency words. Overall, the
patterns of results from the current project raise questions for the generality of the
discrepancy effect in RM and PM.
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Appendices
Appendix A-1. Word Stimuli Used for Experiments 1a and 1b.

abbey
broke
grocery
knock
orthodox
abroad
burned
hail
labeled
outline
absence
bypass
hanging
lame
outlook
abusive
canine
harmony
lean
overload
accident
captive
harness
lift
paddle
acoustic
concise
hazard
lounge
peculiar
acrobat conclude
heal
lust
perceive
adequate
covert
heating
magical
protest
admiral
crisp
helmet
manage
proudly
airborne
cultural
historic
marker
quantum
algae
dairy
hive
massacre
quiet
altitude
deadly
horizon
metric
recipe
anarchy
debug
hornet
midst
reform
ancient
devoted
humanity modular
robin
angst
district
humidity moisture
rusty
apogee
dubious
hymn
mundane
salmon
appendix eagerly
hypnotic muscular
satisfy
arbor
enemy
ignition
naive
secured
Arising
entropy
ignorant
nervous
segment
Arsenal
expert
immunity nominal
sewing
ashamed exposure
imperial nonsense
shadow
autonomy facing
impulse numerous simulate
aviation
fallen
inch
nylon
soil
awhile
favored
inherent
obscene
stable
backup
float
initiate
obsessed
strategy
banned
fortune
instinct
officer
subtle
bargain fragment
intent
omitted
subtract
bearing
funeral
involve opponent suppress
becoming
fuzzy
irony
optical
swimming
biblical
gauge
ivory
orbital
sympathy
boundary gesture
jealous
ordinary
tackle
brigade
gravel
juvenile
origin
tandem
Note. Words with the initial letter “h” or “o” in Experiment
appropriate words in Experiment 1b.
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tangle
uniform
tempest
urged
temporal
usage
terrain
voting
testify
wage
thumb
wake
tiger
warn
tired
wave
titan
wedge
tobacco
whine
toggle
wiring
tomato
witness
tomb
wizard
tongue
wooden
tooth
wording
torso
workshop
tortoise wormhole
tough
wounded
tourist
wrist
toys
yearly
tracked
yeast
trail
youth
trained
zenith
trash
zephyr
trauma
tribute
trigger
trivia
troop
tutor
typical
ultimate
1a were replaced with other

Appendix A-2. Nonword Stimuli Used for Experiments 1a and 1b.

abtrasit
brexe
hacper
lastine
outpoing
tasfy
adebi
bulket
haelly
launfry
outqik
tecih
adophine butral
hakrid
lorexy
oxiden
tedonafy
adsort
catapicy
harvart
loying
padented
telted
adsotelu cenbomed
hategiae lufent
Parec
terexue
agenka
comtete
hattle
lurting
piodeer
tenasi
alumxi
consudaf
hellig
lyfic
pleaked
thilk
amtigue corepht
hobrer
mafenist policked
thoun
ancker
courshey
hodie
mangally qouz
tiam
andiety
cutsody
hondimer markinal quoka
tiffue
anomaty daeher
honisky
medifoke raed
toden
anrosym dangimig
houl
midority redimene
toeflert
antorbal deftent
hugorous mishly
retisent
toel
arcker
deseft
hungle
mopive
retolt
toileg
areow
dycence
hybrogen mosally
sakity
tokf
argonant dysanny
ibiotic
motanery seithute
tonshed
ashorady enudate
idellya
nidely
serkeant
toquite
atomasy etiligle
idvened
noce
sethimed
toqure
attifude
ettiroty
ifle
nodike
sezerely
torbure
atude
etuaqe
ikentify
nodity
singere
tosta
auqirec
extosit
imqict
nugula
sixee
tragide
ausience fakal
infegral
nuklous
skechic
traik
ausora
faloubos
intility
obdly
snouding
tramphu
awarkad fatitue
intly
obgerber squet
tranth
barq
fondeck
intreced
ocune
strige
Traq
batin
forqing
inzestor
ogianic
striktly
trebing
begro
fukile
iplicaet
ogion
struddle
trigent
beltided gaetic
istued
ondoing strunicy
trothy
beskat
geronver
itolased
orein
symbotic
tsunala
biot
giletaec
kecitan
orthid
tadded
tursle
boiking
glecose
kingsom otenly
talamt
ublesife
breitly
gramped
knae
otiender tarcing
unfanky
Note. Nonwords with the initial letter “h” or “o” in Experiment 1a were
appropriate nonwords in Experiment 1b.
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unikom
urgranet
vatation
vatuable
vidible
wabmot
wanerthy
wanger
wealsky
weasher
werended
whape
wikky
worfer
workora
wreish
wure
yaen
yelfow
yerd
Yetl
yielp
zaim

replaced with other

Appendix B-1. Materials Used for Experiment 2: High Frequency Words.
Stimulus
affect
appeal
ball
batch
beach
bear
beast
belt
blade
book
bottle
bread
bull
cage
cancer
car
cat
cell
chance
clay
close
cold
cow
creek
cup
dean
desk
dress
fate
father
fear
fire

Prime
effect
appear
call
watch
reach
hear
least
felt
blame
look
battle
break
pull
page
cancel
far
cut
tell
change
play
clone
hold
low
greek
cut
mean
disk
press
rate
rather
hear
fine

Stimulus
firm
fork
fort
header
hero
home
hood
hope
horn
jacket
king
lake
lamp
lane
laser
lead
letter
life
loss
lung
mall
math
meat
mood
mouth
name
node
peace
plane
pool
reed
retail

Prime
fire
work
sort
leader
here
some
food
home
born
packet
kind
take
camp
line
later
head
better
like
less
long
male
path
beat
wood
month
same
mode
place
place
cool
feed
detail
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Stimulus
rice
road
rose
sake
sea
sector
sheep
shirt
side
sight
singer
snake
socket
sound
stage
suffer
sun
threat
town
trail
tree
truck
vice
wait
wealth
white
wine
winner
wish
world
yard
zone

Prime
race
read
lose
take
set
vector
sleep
short
site
night
finger
shake
rocket
found
state
buffer
run
thread
down
train
free
track
nice
want
health
while
mine
winter
with
would
hard
none

Appendix B-2. Materials Used for Experiment 2: Low Frequency Words.
Stimulus
adept
altar
arid
bead
beaker
bean
beet
blaze
bleak
bleed
boar
boarder
broom
bruise
cavern
cheat
cheer
cloak
comb
coral
crease
dense
dread
dune
dusk
earring
flask
flea
fowl
frail
fright
gaze

Prime
adopt
alter
grid
bear
weaker
mean
bent
blame
break
breed
boat
boarded
bloom
cruise
tavern
cheap
sheer
clock
bomb
moral
create
sense
bread
tune
duck
earning
flash
flew
bowl
trail
bright
gate

Stimulus
gravel
grief
groom
harp
haste
hearth
hermit
hoof
hose
hurl
isle
jade
keg
kilt
kneel
lender
loft
lymph
mayor
meek
mesh
munch
nail
niece
olive
otter
owl
peach
plum
poke
polar
quill

Prime
travel
brief
gloom
harm
taste
health
permit
roof
rose
hurt
idle
made
leg
tilt
knees
gender
lift
nymph
major
seek
mess
bunch
fail
piece
alive
outer
oil
teach
plug
joke
solar
quilt
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Stimulus
realty
rind
roast
romp
rude
rumor
seam
shaker
silo
sinus
soak
soar
spice
spoon
steed
stilt
stool
stroll
tease
toad
torch
tuba
tunic
valve
vase
vine
vulture
weave
wheat
wreath
yearn
zoo

Prime
really
wind
coast
ramp
rule
humor
seat
shakes
silk
minus
soap
sour
spite
spool
steel
still
spool
scroll
cease
load
touch
tube
tonic
value
ease
nine
culture
leave
cheat
breath
learn
too

